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
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Thomas Aquinas

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OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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TREATISE ON MAN

THE “SUMMA THEOLOGICA”

FIRST PART.

QUESTION LXXV.

OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL.

(*In Seven Articles.*)

HAVING treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance; in the first place, of the nature of man, and in the second place, of his origin. The theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul, but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (*Ang. Hier. xi.*) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat firstly of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.

Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Concerning the first, there are seven points to be treated:

- (1) Whether the soul is a body?
- (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
- (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
- (4) Whether the soul is man, or

man is composed of soul and body? (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible? (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS A BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved: firstly, because it seems that nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not, as, for instance, what is not hot does not give heat: secondly, if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved *Phys.* viii.; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body; therefore the soul is a body.

Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.

Obj. 3. Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.

On the contrary, Are the words of Augustine (*De Trin.* vi.) who says that the soul is more simple than the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk.

I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life in those things which live: for we call living things animate (souled): and those things which have no life, inanimate (soulless). Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the

principle of these actions was something corporeal ; for they asserted that only bodies were real things ; and that what is not corporeal is nothing : hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways ; but we shall only make use of one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision ; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul ; but it is the first principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal ; yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such ; since, if that were the case, everything corporeal would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is a living thing or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body ; as heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.

Reply Obj. i. As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in *Phys.* viii., there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally ; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally ; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement ; such a mover is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the body. And because the

philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved ; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower ; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially ; as colour is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality ; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body ; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are composed in order to know all bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of contact ; of quantity, and of power. By the former a body can be touched only by a body ; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS SOMETHING SUBSISTENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be *this particular* thing. Now *this particular* thing is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body ; therefore the soul is not something subsistent.

Obj. 2. Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate ; for, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*), *To say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds.* Therefore the soul is not subsistent.

Obj. 3. Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would

have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding : for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.

On the contrary, Are the words of Augustine (*De Trin. x.*) : *Whoever understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e., imaginary pictures of corporeal things.* Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent.

I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature ; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of other things. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue, being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humour, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle had something corporeal in its nature, it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies ; as when a certain determinate colour is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same colour. Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation of its own apart from the body. Now only a self-subsisting thing can have an operation of its own ; for nothing can operate but what is actual. Hence a thing operates accord-

ing as it exists; for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

Reply Obj. 1. This particular thing can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called *this particular thing* in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called *this particular thing*, in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be *this particular thing*.

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate of itself belongs to what exists of itself. But for a thing to exist of itself, it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist of itself, which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist of itself; nor can it for that reason be said to operate of itself. Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of

the object ; for the phantasm is to the intellect what colour is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent ; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOULS OF BRUTE ANIMALS ARE SUBSISTENT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same *genus* as other animals ; and, as we have just shown, the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.

Obj. 2. Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent ; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is more moved than mover. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body.

On the contrary, Is what is written in the Book of Ecclesiastical Dogma : *Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul : whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent.*

I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both to a corporeal principle, as has been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense ; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that feeling, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the soul

souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, feeling and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body ; as in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflexion of colour : and so with the other senses. So it is clear that the sensitive soul has no operation absolutely proper and belonging to itself alone ; but every operation of the sensitive soul is an operation of the composite. Whence we conclude that as the soul of brute animals does not exercise its operations of itself, it is not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its existence.

Reply Obj. 1. Although man is of the same *genus* as other animals, he is of a different *species*. Specific difference is derived from the difference of form ; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of *genus*.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is to a certain extent the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object ; each being in potentiality to its object. But there is a difference in their relations, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body ; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense ; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects has greater facility in understanding those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Reply Obj. 3. Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion ; the operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body ; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying

the appetite ; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body.

✓ FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is man. For it is written : *Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day* (2 Cor. iv. 16). But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man.

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance ; therefore it is a *hypostasis* or a person ; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man ; for a human person is a man.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xix.) commends Varro as holding *that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body ; but both soul and body*.

I answer that, The assertion, *the soul is man* can be taken in two senses. Firstly, that man is a soul ; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species ; while matter is part of the individual, and not of *the species*.

* This is not true ; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies ; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species ; not, indeed, matter—signate—which is the principle of individuality ; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones ; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones ; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under

a given species, must belong also to the substance of the species.

It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above that to feel is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, to feel is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, supposing that feeling was proper to the soul, maintained man to be a soul making use of the body.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. ix.*), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principal in it; thus what the king does, the kingdom is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principal in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the *inward* man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the *outward* man.

Reply Obj. 2. Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.



FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God ; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (*Div. Nom. v.*). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality ; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding ; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as a part of itself.

Obj. 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul—as to be subject, and to be changed ; for it is subject to science, and virtue ; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. viii.*). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.

Obj. 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.

On the contrary, Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. vii.*) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. Firstly, from the notion of a soul in general ; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be

the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential; for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potential cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the *primary animate (primum animatum)*.

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul, inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely; for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual; just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1. The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually *precontaining all things*, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. v.*). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality

which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived ; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the first act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms ; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 2. To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its existence in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3. A form causes matter to be, and so does the agent ; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form *there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act ; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply a mere essence.*

Reply Obj. 4. Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist of itself, must have existence by participation ; for even life, or anything of that sort, is a participator of existence, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. v.*). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator ; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances, there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form ; but of form and participated

existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that whereby they are and that which they are (*quod est* and *quod est*) ; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS INCORRUPTIBLE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and mode of acting seemingly have a like end. But the beginning by generation of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both ; because *all things breathe alike : and man hath nothing more than the beast*, as it is written (Eccles. iii. 19). Therefore, as the same inspired writer concludes : *The death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal*. But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore also, the human soul is corruptible.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness ; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wisd. ii. 2), *We are born of nothing* ; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, *After this we shall be as if we had not been*, even as to our soul.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm ; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are *intellectual*, and that they have *an incorruptible substantial life*.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing

may be corrupted in two ways—of itself, and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence of itself cannot be generated or corrupted except of itself; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above that the souls of brutes are not subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted of itself. This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a

sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of *here* and *now*, whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish as expressed in these words (*Wisd. ii.*). Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals are made of earth alike. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; but the human soul is produced by God. And to signify this, it is written as to other animals: *Let the earth bring forth the living soul* (*Gen. i.*). But of man it is written that: *He breathed into his face the breath of life*. And so in the last chapter of *Ecclesiastes* (*xii. 7*) it is concluded: *The dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it*. Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (*Eccles. iii. 19*): *All things breathe alike*, and (*Wis. ii. 2*), *The breath in our nostrils is smoke*. But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: *Man has nothing more than beasts*. Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, but not as to the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. As a thing can be created, by reason not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.

Reply Obj. 3. To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the

body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on (Q. LXXXIX.).

✓ SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS OF THE SAME SPECIES AS AN
ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.

Obj. 2. Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual existence. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.

Obj. 3. Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and an angel are of the same species.

On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. vii.*): *Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things.* Subsequently he says the opposite of this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species.

I answer that, Origen (*Peri Archon iii.*) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have

seen above (Q. XLVII.). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity in species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; as in species of colours one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a *genus* are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect is to the imperfect, since the *principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof*, as is written, *Metaph. x.* The same would follow if the above-mentioned substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, then it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Q. LXXVI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.

Reply Obj. 2. The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Hence, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is in-

determinate and common to many degrees of understanding ; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is not of the essence of the soul ; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, the soul alone is not the species, but the *composite*. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

QUESTION LXXVI.

OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now consider the union of the soul with the body ; and concerning this there are eight points for inquiry : (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form ? (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies ; or is there one intelligence for all men ? (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul ? (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form ? (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form ? (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body ? (7) Whether by means of an accident ? (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body ?



✓ FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that the intellect is separate, and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 2. Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form ; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its

form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; thus, it would not be capable of knowledge of all things, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LXXV., A. 2); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 4. Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever has existence of itself is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists. Thus the very existence of a form does not belong to the form of itself. But the intellectual principle has existence of itself and is subsistent, as was said above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 6. Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by any accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. There-

fore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, *difference* is derived from the *form*. But the difference which constitutes man is *rational*, which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed : for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; so a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, feeling, and local movement; and likewise the primary principle whereby we understand. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (*De Anima* ii.). But if anyone say that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (*Phys.* v.); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality,

as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed by any accidental quality, but by virtue of his being a man, which is predicated of him essentially. So we must say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul ; or we must say that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 4), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he feels. But one cannot feel without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.

The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the passive intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the passive intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colours to the sense of sight, as he says *De Anima* iii. Therefore, as the species of colours are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the passive intellect. But it is clear that because the colours, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the passive intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood.

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is

united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. Firstly, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because, since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is to the whole Socrates, as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (*De Anima* iii.). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees, because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one.

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. So from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (*Ethic. x.*) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man.

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rules over corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetable soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetable soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called *the intellect*.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the *primary animate*, as was said above (Q. LXXV.).

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii.), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate ; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that man and the sun generate man from matter. It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye ; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections : since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body.

Reply Obj. 4. The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 5. The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence ; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body ; but it is not so with other forms.

Reply Obj. 6. To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its own proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper

place ; so the human soul retains its own proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS MULTIPLIED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF BODIES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance ; for it is not composed of matter and form, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men.

Obj. 2. Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain ; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. This is heretical ; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments.

Obj. 3. Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours ; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours : which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.

Obj. 4. Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you ; and consequently it will

be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood ; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both ; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect ; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men.

Obj. 5. Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple ; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but one ; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine (*De Quant. Animæ*) says : *If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself.* But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii.) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals.

I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man ; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak ; which is quite absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to

the opinion of Aristotle (*De Anima* ii.), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence.

Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent; and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions ; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act ; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope ; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man ; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sense ; for instance, if two men had one eye, there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not effected by any organ other than the intellect itself ; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action : that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object.

However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms

—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the passive intellect; since the same agent, according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the passive intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.

Reply Obj. 2. Everything has unity in the same way that it has existence; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its existence. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very existence, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own existence. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied existence.

Reply Obj. 3. Individuation of the intelligent being, or of

the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species.

Reply Obj. 4. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for *the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is*, as is said (*De Anima* iii.). Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself; otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen

to be known by several knowers ; as is apparent in regard to the senses ; for several see the same colour, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality ; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles ; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same conditions as those under which it is understood ; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.

Reply Obj. 5. One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. As to how it is caused, that will be shown later on (Q. CXVII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER BESIDES THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL THERE ARE IN MAN OTHER SOULS ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible ; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible. Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.

Obj. 2. Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible ; on the contrary, *corruptible and incorruptible differ generically*, says the Philosopher (*Metaph. x.*). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same *genus*. Now, an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul ; and, therefore, *animal* will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.*) that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But this would be impossible if the essence of the sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul ; for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a man by the intellectual soul. Therefore in man the essence of the sensitive soul is not the same as the essence of the intellectual soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says (*Metaph. viii.*) that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But *reasonable*, which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul ; while he is called *animal* by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.

On the contrary, It is said (*De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*) : *Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write ; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood ; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason ; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own rule.*

I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscent in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion

is rejected by Aristotle (*De Anima* ii.), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs ; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided, in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be *only logically* distinct from the other parts of the soul, *or also locally*.

The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul were supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors ; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three reasons.

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence : for a thing has from the same source both existence and unity ; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one ; as, for instance, *a white man*. If, therefore, man were *living* by one form, the vegetable soul, and *animal* by another form, the sensitive soul, and *man* by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues (*Metaph.* viii.) against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (*De Anima* i.), *What contains them ?*—that is, what makes them one ? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body ; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things

which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered one to another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate ; as a surface is presupposed to colour ; so that if we say that a body with a surface is coloured, we have the second manner of essential predication). Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows that either one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false : because *animal* is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally ; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man ; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and the imperfect ; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals ; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle (*Metaph.* viii.) compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (*De Anima* ii.) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains

another ; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and an animal by another ; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.

Reply Obj. 1. The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible ; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

Reply Obj. 2. Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals.

Reply Obj. 3. The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual : as will be shown farther on (Q. CXVIII., A. 2 ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4. We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the *genus* : while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting ; and thence it gathers the *difference* of man.



FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN MAN THERE IS ANOTHER FORM BESIDES
THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), that *the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially*. Therefore the soul is to the body as a form to matter. But the body has a substantial form, by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii.). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved as he says (*ibid.* v.), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.

Obj. 3. Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for *before* and *after* apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.

On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial existence. But the substantial form gives substantial exist-

ence. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.

I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body as movable by the soul, is constituted in its existence. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form (as we have said above), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be *simply*, but to be *such*, as heat does not make a thing to exist simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular relationship to another; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is not said to be corrupted simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives simple existence; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being—for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that *every generation is nothing but an alteration*, as we read *Phys.* i.. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give existence simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 1. Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but *the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially*; and that this potentiality *does not reject the soul*. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the *act of a body*, etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. The first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality *does not reject*—that is, does not exclude—the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.

Reply Obj. 3. We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, feeling, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which only gives matter the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

Reply Obj. 4. Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the

elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter ; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole ; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.

Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be *more or less* ; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial existence of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers (*Metaph.* viii.) ; and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive *more or less*. Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i.), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified ; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body ; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.



FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL IS PROPERLY
UNITED TO SUCH A BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is

incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.

Obj. 3. Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species.

Obj. 4. Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and nails instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as nails, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), that *the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially.*

I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (Q. LV., A. 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal

instrument. Therefore it behoved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception ; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness ; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. v.*). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe *those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima ii.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient ; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace ; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found ; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form ; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material ; but that the teeth of the saw become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its own matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do ; but what is

suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.

Reply Obj. 2. A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3. The parts of an animal, as, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants.

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are *the organs of organs* (*De Anima* iii.), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.

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SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY
THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF ACCIDENTAL DISPOSITIONS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

Obj. 2. Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species.

Obj. 3. Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident.

On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. vii.*). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.

I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; rather, on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.

If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above (A 1.), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial

form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as ~~not~~, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual evidence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every *genus* follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.

Reply Obj. 2. Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very existence to the body as a form; yet also it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE ANIMAL BODY
BY MEANS OF A BODY?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* vii.), that *the soul administers the body by light*, that is, by fire, *and by air, which are most akin to a spirit*. But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.

Obj. 2. Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body.

Obj. 3. Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), *We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one.* But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.

I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer.

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as

we have said above, it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of which is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act ; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Whence the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its own nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* viii.).

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence ; so that the vegetable soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven ; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven ; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictitious and ridiculous : for light is not a body ; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually : and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body ; whence he uses the word *administration*. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says (*De Causa Motus Animalium*).

Reply Obj. 2. The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union ; but because of the removal of that disposition by which

the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.



EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN EACH PART OF THE BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says (*De Causa Motus Animalium*), *It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own.*

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima ii.*) that, the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the soul is whole in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.

Obj. 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are based on the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul

are in each part of the body ; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye : and this is absurd.

Obj. 5. Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body ; each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another ; nor would one part be nobler than another ; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. vi.*), that *in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.*

I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house ; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form ; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal ; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima ii.*). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action ; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates, wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof.

That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided

into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface, and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation.

Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so

forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts ; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible (matter) ; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible (matter).

Reply Obj. 3. An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible (matter). Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal.

Reply Obj. 4. Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely, the intellect and the will ; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body ; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.

Reply Obj. 5. One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body : as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner.

QUESTION LXXVII.

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF
THE SOUL IN GENERAL.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul ; firstly, in general, secondly, in particular. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power ? (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several ? (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another ? (4) Of the order of the powers, one to another. (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject ? (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul ? (7) Whether one power rises from another ? (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL IS ITS POWER ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix.), that *mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially* : and (*ibid. x.*), that *memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence*.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power.

Obj. 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form ; a sign of which is that the substantial form

is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, we feel by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But *that by which we first feel and understand* is the soul, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii.). Therefore the soul is its own power.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else beside the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see *Obj. 1*) are not in the soul as in a subject, as colour or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: whereas the mind can love and know other things (*De Trin.* ix.).

Obj. 6. Further, a simple form cannot be a subject. But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject.

Obj. 7. Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.

On the contrary, Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* xi.) says that *heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation*. Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.

I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. Firstly, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power of that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus

of substance ; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation, is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature ; as we have said above when speaking of the angels (Q. LIV., A. 3). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations ; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it is *the act of a body having life potentially* ; which potentiality, however, *does not exclude the soul*. Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are *one life, one mind, one essence*. Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power ; as animal in a man and in a horse ; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be

predicated of each part ; yet, in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together ; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and will are the one essence of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.

Reply Obj. 3. Action belongs to the composite, as does existence ; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form ; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Whence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action ; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that *the soul is whereby we understand and feel.*

Reply Obj. 5. If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident ; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident ; and belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing ; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense ; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species.

For the *proper* does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species ; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense ; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.

Reply Obj. 6. Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5 ad 4) ; and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The proposition quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act ; in treating of which subject Boëthius employs that phrase (*De Trin.* i.).

Reply Obj. 7. Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents ; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL POWERS OF THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power. Therefore also in the intellectual soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power.

Obj. 3. Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVI., AA. 3, 4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.

On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (*De Anima* ii.).

I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (*De Caelo* ii.), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements ; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements ; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements ; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed to health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies ; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies ; and better still, he who can by few remedies ; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness ; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible ; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers ;—because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures ; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness ; although by many and

various means ; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things : but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.

Reply Obj. 3. One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.



THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWERS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR
ACTS AND OBJECTS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power ; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.

Obj. 2. Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers ; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power of taste to sweet and bitter.

Obj. 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. So if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false ; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive.

Obj. 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to some one power ; as sound and colour belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under

the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.

On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.) that *acts and operations precede the powers according to the reason; and these again are preceded by the opposites*, that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.

I answer that, A power acts according to its nature. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from its act, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for colour is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects.

Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be coloured is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of colour, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Whence *rational* and *irrational* are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner, therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed.

Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into colour, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to colour, namely, sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something coloured, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.

Reply Obj. 1. Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end.

Reply Obj. 2. If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard white as such, but as colour. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a thing which is the same in subject with another from being considered under different aspects; therefore it can belong to various powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power as such regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power as such considers; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers as such. Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher power.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AMONG THE POWERS OF THE SOUL THERE IS ORDER ?

We thus proceed to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are divided against one another. Therefore there is no order among them.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects, and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as colour and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*De Anima* ii.) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. Therefore also the powers of the soul have order.

I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Now we may observe a triple order among them, two of which are according to the dependence of one power on another; and the third is taken from the order of the objects. The dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to

the order of generation and time ; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers ; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul ; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first ; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.

Reply Obj. 1. The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature ; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus.

Reply Obj. 2. This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist, are such that the action of one depends on another.



FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE IN THE SOUL AS THEIR SUBJECT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body ; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers ; therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul ; because, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima ii.*), *The soul is the first thing by which we feel and understand.* But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) that the soul feels certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and suchlike ; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not feel anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers ; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Somno et Vigilia*) that *feeling belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite.* Therefore the sensitive power is in the composite as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.

I answer that, the subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the *subject of power* is of necessity *the subject of operation* ; as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of *De Somno et Vigilia*. Now, it is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXV., AA. 2, 3 ; Q. LXXVI., A. 1 ad 1), that some

operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs ; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations, have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.

Reply Obj. 1. All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle ; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Reply Obj. 2. All such powers are firstly in the soul, as compared to the composite ; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Reply Obj. 3. Plato's opinion was that feeling is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul feels some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words *with the body or without the body* may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul feels nothing without the body, because the action of feeling cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object felt. Thus the soul feels some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort ; while it feels some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad, or joyful on hearing something.



SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWERS OF THE SOUL FLOW FROM ITS
ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.

Obj. 2. Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers ; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

Obj. 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii.) ; except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (*De Anima* i.). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.

On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents ; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from *Metaph.* viii. Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause.

I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act ; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. Firstly, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely ; but to exist as such, or so great, or in some particular condition ; for its subject is an actual

being. Whence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form, prior to its being observed in the subject : and since that which is first in a genus, is the cause in that genus ; the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form, prior to its being observed in the accidental form ; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form : but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and natural (*per se*) accident ; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.

Secondly, the substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form ; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. Now it is clear, from what has been said, that the subject of the soul's powers is either the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6) ; or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle ; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1. From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally,—(if they proceed) in a certain order ; or if there be diversity of recipients. So, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed ; both because order exists among these powers ; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply Obj. 2. The subject is both the final cause, and in

a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle ; and of some as receptive thereof.

Reply Obj. 3. The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance ; thus one thing results naturally from another, as colour from light.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE POWER OF THE SOUL ARISES FROM ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another.

Obj. 2. Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another ; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another.

Obj. 3. Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite ; but everything rises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.

On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions ; but the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another.

I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are several

kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body ; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect ; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence ; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more imperfect powers are principles with regard to the others ; as the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for animal is generated before man.

Reply Obj. 1. As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.

Reply Obj. 2. An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident ; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another ; as surface is of colour, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect ; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things by their nature proceed from perfect things.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SOUL WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book *De Spiritu et Anima* that *the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility*.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong ; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.

Obj. 3. Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak ; because, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*), *If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man.* But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (*De Memor. et Remin. i.*). But memory remains in the separated soul ; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell : *Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime* (Luke xvi. 25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul ; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Obj. 5. Further, joy and sadness are in the concupiscent part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls are saddened or rejoiced at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscent power remains in the separate soul.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite

dead, sees some things by imaginary vision ; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul ; and consequently all the other powers.

On the contrary, It is said (*De Eccl. Dogm.*) that *of two substances only does man consist ; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses.* Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.

I answer that, As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject ; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite ; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually ; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul ; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 1. That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said ; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.

Reply Obj. 2. These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.

Reply Obj. 3. These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers.

Reply Obj. 4. The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (*De Trin. x.*) places

memory in the mind ; not as a part of the sensitive soul.

Reply Obj. 5. Sadness and joy are in the separate soul, not in the sensitive appetite, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Whence he retracted some things which he had said there (*Retract.* ii.).

~~X~~ QUESTION LXXVIII.

OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The consideration of the theologian extends itself only to a special inquiry concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: firstly, we consider those things which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.

Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) The powers of the soul considered generally. (2) The various species of the vegetative part. (3) The exterior senses. (4) The interior senses.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE TO BE DISTINGUISHED FIVE GENERA
OF POWERS IN THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of

its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), *In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment.* Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetite is excluded.

Obj. 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul; for sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read, *The eyes desireth favour and beauty, but more than these green sown fields* (*Eccl.* xl. 22). In the same way every other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect, or appetite, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), *The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual.*

I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul, which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the *rational soul*. Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the *sensitive soul*; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such

corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities ; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature ; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle ; for this is common to all the operations of the soul, since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the *vegetative soul* ; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.).

Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul ; the powers of this genus are called *vegetative*, for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. Firstly, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the

soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers—namely, the *sensitive* in regard to the less common object—the sensible body ; and the *intellectual*, in regard to the most common object—universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul : one—the *appetitive*—in respect of which the soul is compared to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention ; the other—the *locomotive* power—in respect of which the soul is compared to something extrinsic as the term of operation and movement ; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.

The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power ; such are immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessities of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things ; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (*De Anima* ii.).

Thus the first two objections are hereby solved.

Reply Obj. 3. The *natural appetite* is that inclination each thing has, of its own nature, for something ; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the *animal appetite* results from the form apprehended ; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul—mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only—namely, for the purpose of seeing ; but the

animal by the appetitive power, desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of feeling them ; there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.

Reply Obj. 4. Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet, sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them ; for sense and appetite exist in immovable animals, and yet they have not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite.



SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PARTS OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS THE NUTRITIVE, AUGMENTATIVE, AND GENERATIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called *natural* forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than the body.

But the body by the same force gives species and quantity ; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Obj. 4. Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (*De Anima* ii.), being *a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it*. Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.) that *the operations of the soul are generation, the use of food, and growth.*

I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said, has for its object the body itself, living by the soul ; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the *generative* power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity ; to this is directed the *augmentative* power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity ; to this is directed the *nutritive* power.

We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another ; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things ; although it does so in a more excellent and more universal manner ; for that which is highest in an inferior nature, approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius

(*Div. Nom.* vii.). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to produce another like unto itself. And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers ; and the augmentative power is helped by the nutritive.

Reply Obj. 1. Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity, and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way) ; and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions.

Reply Obj. 2. Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source ; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen ; and this is the generative power.

Reply Obj. 3. Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent ; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.

Reply Obj. 4. As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.


 THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIVE EXTERIOR SENSES ARE PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

Obj. 2. Further, size and shape, and other things which are called *common sensibles*, are *not sensibles by accident*, but are contra - distinguished from them by the Philosopher (*De Anima ii.*). But the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, size and shape are further from colour than sound is, it seems that the sensitive power that can grasp size or shape is more necessary than that which grasps colour or sound.

Obj. 3. Further, one sense regards one contrariety ; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contrarieties ; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.

Obj. 4. Further, species is not divided against the genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense from touch.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*) : *There is no other besides the five senses.*

I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic, and is either water or air, or suchlike. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For

the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers ; therefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs ; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. But to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.

The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and directly. Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally changed by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such change is what is directly perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.

Now, change is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing changed, as the form of colour is received into the pupil which does not thereby become coloured. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural change alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.

But in some senses we find spiritual change only, as in *sight* : while in others we find not only a spiritual but also a natural change ; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural change, as to place, in sound which is the object of *hearing* ; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of the air : and we find natural change by alteration, in odour which is the object of *smelling* ; for in order

to exhale an odour, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of the organ, natural change takes place in *touch* and *taste*; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavoured morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural change unless indirectly.

Now, the sight, which is without natural change either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural change on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii.). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we will speak later on. Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural change in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every accident has in itself a power of making a change, but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration; therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses: because *the senses are changed by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are changed*, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii.).

Reply Obj. 2. Size, shape, and the like which are called *common sensibles*, are midway between *accidental sensibles* and the *proper sensibles*, which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists in fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are felt, accordingly as the subject is affected in one or more ways in its size or in local distance, as to the movement of growth, and as to local motion: or, again, (according as it is affected) in some sensible qualities,

as in the movement of alteration ; and thus to feel movement and to feel rest is, in a way, to feel many things and to feel one. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of colour. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality ; as the surface by reason of colour. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the change of the senses. For sense is affected differently by a large and by a small surface : since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore is divided according to its proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher seems to say (*De Anima* ii.), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties ; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body ; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.

Reply Obj. 4. The sense of taste according to a saying of the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii.), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object : we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of alteration. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, alteration in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily changed by a natural alteration by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes

sweet or bitter : but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavour, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.



FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTERIOR SENSES ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffice. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things ; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner also they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions ; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the colour ; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (*De Memor. et Remin. i.*), the imagination and the memory are passions of the *first sensitive*. But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.

Obj. 4. Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses ; whence we read (*Poster. i.*), that *those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge*. Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the *estimative*

power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.

Obj. 5. Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding, and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cogitative and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) describes three kinds of visions ; namely, corporeal, which is an action of the sense ; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy ; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.

On the contrary, Avicenna (*De Anima* iv.) assigns five interior sensitive powers ; namely, *common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.*

I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers ; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent : the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually

affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and sad things only as afflicting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its colour or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an alteration caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the *proper sense* and the *common sense* are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on. But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the *phantasy* or *imagination* is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the *estimative power* is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the *memorative power*, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in

some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly altered by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, but man by means of collation of ideas. Therefore the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the *cogitative*, which by some sort of collation discovers these ends. Wherefore it is also called the *particular reason*, to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also *reminiscence* by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and the imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book *On sense and sensibles*. So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.

Reply Obj. 1. The interior sense is not called *common* by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Reply Obj. 2. The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under

the same sense ; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet : because what discerns between two things, must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense ; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred : and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived ; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is altered, in which alteration the action of sight is completed, and from which alteration follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Reply Obj. 3. As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVII., A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the *first sensitive*.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses : yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.

Reply Obj. 5. The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part ; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in the other animals.

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that such sight is common to all interior apprehensions.

QUESTION LXXIX.
OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.
(*In Thirteen Articles.*)

THE next question concerns the intellectual powers, about which thirteen points are for consideration : (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence ? (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power ? (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect ? (4) Whether it is something in the soul ? (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all ? (6) Whether memory is in the intellect ? (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect ? (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect ? (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers ? (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect ? (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers ? (12) Whether *synderesis* is a power of the intellectual part ? (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT IS A POWER OF THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence : for Augustine says (*De Trin. ix.*), *Mind and spirit are not relative, but denominate the essence.* Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (*De Trin.* x.) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension, *man understands with the angels*. But angels are called *minds* and *intellects*. Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.

Obj. 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (*De Anima* ii.).

I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown (Q. LIV., A. 3; Q. LXXVII., A. 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being : for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence : while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is a power.

Reply Obj. 1. Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul ; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power ; and thus we read (*De Anima* i.), that the *intellect is a substance*. And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (*De Trin.* ix., xiv.).

Reply Obj. 2. The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the

different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it : for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind ; and the Philosopher, in the reason (*De Anima* iii.).

Reply Obj. 3. In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a *mind* or an *intellect* ; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore there is no likeness between the two orders.

Reply Obj. 4. The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect ; but its immateriality gives its power of intelligence. Wherefore it does not follow that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but its virtue and power.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT IS A PASSIVE POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). But if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible (*De Anima* iii.). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.

Obj. 3. Further, the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xii.) and Aristotle (*De Anima* iii.) say. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active ; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that *to understand is in a way to be passive* (*De Anima* iii.).

I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination : as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed ; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful ; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being : and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which virtually and as in its origin, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being ; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence ; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act : as the matter of the heavenly bodies (Q. LVIII., A. 1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act ; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic

intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first *like a clean tablet on which nothing is written*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is *in a way to be passive*; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.

Obj. 1. This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

Obj. 2. *Passive intellect* is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called *rational by participation*, because it *obeys the reason* (*Ethic.* i.). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the *particular reason*. And in each case *passive* may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the *possible* intellect (*De Anima* iii.), is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. And hence it is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 3. The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.

✓ THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS AN ACTIVE INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only passive.

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses, there is something active, such as light : on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous ; for colour of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect, to make the species actually intelligible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), *As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things.* Therefore we must admit an active intellect.

I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible ; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are

intelligible : since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms *species or ideas* ; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species : and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter ; and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible : it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act ; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect, some power, to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensible things are found in act outside the soul ; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive : but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colours actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason, as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight ; not for the colours to become actually visible ; but in order that the *nedium* may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on *De Anima* ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing ; but not for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen

that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature ; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice, but for the presence of the active intellect, which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS SOMETHING IN THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul : according to these words, *He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world* (John i.). Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) says of the active intellect, *that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand*. But our soul does not always understand : sometimes it understands, and sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul ; and also the active intellect, which is an active power : it follows that man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) says that the active intellect is *a substance in actual being*. But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the

same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

Obj. 5. Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit ; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul ; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power, while habit is something which follows from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect : which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), that *it is necessary for these differences to be in the soul*, namely, the passive and active intellect.

I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man, we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power ; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding ; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand. Wherefore some held that this intellect substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually

intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes : for the sun alone does not generate man ; but in man is the power of begetting man : and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein ; as we have said above of the passive intellect (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action, must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (*De Anima* iii.) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air : while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul, to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on *De Anima* iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude ; as will be shown later on (Q. XC., A. 3; I.-II., Q. III., A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. iv. 7, *The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.*

Reply Obj. 1. That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act : of which he had already said : *Knowledge in act is the same as the thing.* Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect,

then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 3. If the relation of the active intellect to the passive intellect were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight ; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act : for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation : since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter : which power is called *the active intellect* ; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the *passive intellect* by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Reply Obj. 5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the Supreme Intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the Supreme Intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS ONE IN ALL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one active intellect is in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is *separate*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men.

Obj. 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity, is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.

Obj. 3. Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.

I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). For it is impossible for one same power to belong to various substances.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because as he says: *The agent is more noble than the patient.* Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ.

And in the same sense the active intellect is also called *separate*; but not as a separate substance.

Reply Obj. 2. The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3. All things which are of one species, enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles, proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.



SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEMORY IS IN THE INTELLECTUAL PART OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*) that to the higher part of the soul belong those things which are not *common to man and beast*. But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (*ibid.*) that *beasts can feel corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory*. Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory,

therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time ; which involves knowledge under the conditions of *here* and *now*. But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive part.

Obj. 3. Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act ; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. x.*) that *memory, understanding, and will are one mind*.

I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect : because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as anyone ceases to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in his intellect, and if he wishes to understand that thing anew, he must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into his passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect, there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect ; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part

which is not actually understood : wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (*De Anima* iii.) that, when the passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act, and that this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering. But the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating : for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding — namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal matter. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them : much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory, only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Reply Obj. 1. Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united : since the memorative

power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.*

Reply Obj. 2. The past may be referred to two things—namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being affected by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have felt before in the past, and to have felt some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or to-morrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q. LXXVI., A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something *here and now*.

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the

intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act : and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL MEMORY IS A POWER DISTINCT
FROM THE INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (*De Trin.* x.) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.

Obj. 2. The reason of distinction among the powers of the sensitive part is the same as among the powers of the intellectual part. But the memory of the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). Therefore the memory of the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* x., xi.), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of the species. But the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.

I answer that, As has been said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different natures of their objects : since the nature of each power consists in its relation to its object. It has also been said above (Q. LIX., A. 4) that if any power by its nature be ordered to an object according to the common nature of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object : just as the

power of sight, which regards its object under the common nature of colour, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common nature of being : since the passive intellect is *in which all are in potentiality*. Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect : because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object, as a being in act is to a being in potentiality ; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object, as a being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect : for it belongs to the nature of a passive power, to retain as well as to receive.

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is said that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, yet this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (*De Trin. xiv.*) that *if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only.* And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking ; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent. Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers ; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention ; by intelligence, the act of the intellect ; and by will, the act of the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit ; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.



EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REASON IS DISTINCT FROM THE
INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For, as we read in *De Spiritu et Anima*: *When we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense offers itself to us, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect.* Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Obj. 3. Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iii.) that *that in which man excels irrational animals* is reason, or mind, or intelligence, or whatever appropriate name we like to give it. Therefore reason, intellect, and mind are one power.

I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels who, according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.).

But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another ; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession ; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest ; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of seeking and finding, advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles ; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things : since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason : and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply Obj. 1. That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. It may be added that the book quoted is not of great authority.

Reply Obj. 2. The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boëthius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply Obj. 3. Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HIGHER AND LOWER REASON ARE DISTINCT POWERS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii.), that *the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower.* But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing flows from itself : but the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi.) that *the scientific part* of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another *principle*, and *another part from the opinionative and reasoning part*, by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that, for those things which are *generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained.* Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the *scientific part* must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (*loc. cit.*) is *intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal*: and that what the Philosopher calls the *reasoning or opinionative part* is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, is *intent on the disposal of temporal things.* Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.

Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) that *opinion rises from imagination : then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth : whence mens (mind) is derived from metiendo (measuring).* And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision. Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct

from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*) that *the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions*. Therefore they are not two powers.

I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that *the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal*: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which *is intent on the disposal of temporal things*. Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal—are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of finding, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (*Rom. i.*), *The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*: but by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science—for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.

Reply Obj. 1. We can speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts ; but not because they are different powers.

Reply Obj. 2. The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be regulated by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The *scientific* part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason : for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the *opinionative* and the *ratiocinative* part is something less than the lower reason ; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things : because it knows both according to the same objective notion—namely, according to the notion of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth ; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly ; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the *scientific* and the *ratiocinative*, not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common notion of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 4. That distinction given by Damascene is

according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For *opinion* signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to *judge* or *measure* (*mensurare*) is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word *mens* (mind). Lastly, to *understand* is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER INTELLIGENCE IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in *De Spiritu et Anima* that *when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then reason, then imagination, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence*. But imagination and sense are distinct powers ; therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says (*De Consol. v.*) that *sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another*. But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore it seems that intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Obj. 3. Further, *actions come before powers*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima ii.*). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*) that *the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is, wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue*. Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false. But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore the intelligence is not another power than the intellect.

I answer that, This word *intelligence* properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called *intelligences*, and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called *intellects* or *minds*. Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects—namely, the *active* and *passive* intellects, the *intellect in habit*, and the *actual* intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power.

Reply Obj. 2. Boëthius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.

Reply Obj. 3. All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called *intelligence*. Secondly, it

orders what it apprehends, to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation ; and this is called *intention*. And when it goes on in search of what it intends, it is called *invention*. When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to *phronesis* or *wisdom* ; for it belongs to the wise man to judge, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* i.). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others ; and this is the ordering of *interior speech*, from which proceeds *external speech*. For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4).

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL INTELLECTS ARE DISTINCT POWERS ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from *De Anima* ii. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power ; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.

Obj. 2. Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is *truth*, and of the practical is *good* ; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.

Obj. 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power from power, as we have said above. Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.

On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension
III.

becomes practical. But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.

I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing coloured to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. ~~E~~ Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be ordered to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which ordains what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which ordains what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.); that *the speculative differs from the practical in its end*. Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical, which means operative.

Reply Obj. 1. The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply Obj. 2. Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the nature of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good ordered to operation, and under the form of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it orders the known truth to operation.

Reply Obj. 3. Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A. 7 ad 2, Q. LXXVII., A. 3 ad 4).

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SYNDERESIS IS A SPECIAL POWER OF THE SOUL
DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that *synderesis* is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome (*Ezech. i.*) *synderesis* is divided against the *irascible*, the *concupiscent*, and the *rational* powers. Therefore *synderesis* is a power.

Obj. 2. Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But *synderesis* and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because *synderesis* always incites to good ; while sensuality always incites to evil : whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (*De Trin. xii.*). It seems, therefore, that *synderesis* is a power just as sensuality is.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb. ii.*) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain *rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable*. And this is what we call *synderesis*. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*), it seems that *synderesis* is the same as reason. And thus it is a power.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (*Metaph. viii.*), *rational powers regard opposite things*. But *synderesis* does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore *synderesis* is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

I answer that, *Synderesis* is not a power but a habit ; though some held that it is a power higher than reason ; while others said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally

known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle; and it ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is agreed that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so the practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called *the understanding of principles*, as the Philosopher explains (*Ethic.* vi.). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call *synderesis*. Whence *synderesis* is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as, through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that *synderesis* is not a power, but a natural habit.

Reply Obj. 1. The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.

Reply. Obj. 2. In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to *synderesis* is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.

Reply Obj. 3. Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to *synderesis* as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by *synderesis*.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONSCIENCE BE A POWER?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that conscience is a power; for Origen says that *conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit*

accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good. But in the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. iv. 13), *Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind*—or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*). Therefore conscience is a power.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin ; for we read of some that *their mind and conscience are stained* (Titus i. 19). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.

Obj. 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act ; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit ; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.

On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

I answer that, Properly speaking conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something : for conscience may be resolved into *cum alio scientia*, *i.e.*, knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do : which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something ; *thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others* (Eccles. vii. 23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as

through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done ; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit—namely, *synderesis*, as Jerome calls *synderesis* conscience (Gloss. Ezech. i. 6) ; and Basil the *natural power of judgment* ; and Damascene says that it is the *law of our intellect*. For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.

Reply Obj. 1. Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind ; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.

Reply Obj. 2. Stain is said to be in the conscience, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge ; so far as someone knows he is stained.

Reply Obj. 3. Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called *synderesis*. And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.

QUESTION LXXX.

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL.

(*In Two Articles.*)

NEXT we consider the appetitive powers : and concerning this four things are to be considered : first, the appetitive powers in general ; second, sensuality ; third, the will ; fourth, the free-will. Concerning the first, two things are asked : (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul ? (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE APPETITE IS A SPECIAL POWER OF THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But to desire is common to animate and inanimate things : for all desire good, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. i.*). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing—namely, its own suitable object. There-

fore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (*De Anima* ii.) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) distinguishes the appetitive powers from the powers of knowledge.

I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form : for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate of knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things : for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect : and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, *in Whom all things pre-exist*, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* v.).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge, in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms ; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. Desire is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all

things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.

Reply Obj. 2. What is apprehended and what is desired is the same in reality, but differs in aspect : for it is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. But diversity of aspect in the objects is required for diversity of powers, and not material diversity.

Reply Obj. 3. Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing : but simply as suitable to the animal.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL APPETITES ARE DISTINCT POWERS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3). But it is accidental to the desirable thing whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals ; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part : for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Obj. 3. Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is ordered as a lower power, so also is the motive

power thus ordered. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) distinguishes a double appetite, and says that the higher appetite moves the lower.

I answer that, We have to recognize that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended : wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii. and *Metaph.* xii.). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles ; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive : indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different ; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect ; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature ; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal ; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Rheticic.* ii.) that hatred can regard a universal, as when *we hate every kind of thief*. In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not

apprehended by sense ; as knowledge, virtue, and such-like.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), a universal opinion does not move except by means of a particular opinion ; and in like manner the higher appetite moves by means of the lower : and therefore there are not two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the sense.

QUESTION LXXXI.

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY.

(*In Three Articles.*)

Now we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which three things are asked : (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power ? (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscent as distinct powers ? (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscent powers obey reason ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SENSUALITY IS ONLY APPETITIVE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also apprehensive. For Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*) that *the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts.* But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is apprehensive.

Obj. 2. Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (*De Trin. xii.*) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore also sensuality is apprehensive.

Obj. 3. Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the power of knowledge. Therefore sensuality is an apprehensive power.

On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as *the appetite of things belonging to the body.*

I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (*De Trin. xii.*) just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement, as the act of the appetite: for the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Reply Obj. 2. Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3. The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS DIVIDED INTO THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE AS DISTINCT POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii.). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.

Obj. 3. Further, hatred is in the irascible part : for Jerome says on Matt. xiii. 33 : *We may be said to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power.* But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*) and Damascene (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.

I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality ; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are produc-

tive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscent */* another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible.] Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscent appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscent appetite: since concupiscence, on being roused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscent, when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscent desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscent flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscent appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscent—namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* viii.).

Reply Obj. 1. The concupiscent power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply Obj. 2. As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 2) ; so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defence : and this is the irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3. Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscent appetite : but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITES OBEY REASON ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the irascible and concupiscent appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscent are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*). Therefore the irascible and concupiscent appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscent appetites resist reason : according to the Apostle (Rom. vii. 23) : *I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.* Therefore the irascible and concupiscent appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 2. Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason : for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscent, obey reason.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*) that *the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger.*

I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscent powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; firstly, as to the reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above, is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some *the particular reason*, because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscent and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscent are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscent and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep fearing the wolf, flies at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscent appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (*De Anima. iii.*), that *the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves*

the lower. In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscent are subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscent powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (*Polit. i.*) : *We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle : for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power ; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power.* For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, is moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscent by a politic power : because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscent powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we feel or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscent resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Reply Obj. 3. The exterior senses require for action ex-

terior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

QUESTION LXXXII.

OF THE WILL.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE now consider the will, about which five points have to be resolved : (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity ? (2) Whether it desires everything of necessity ? (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect ? (4) Whether the will moves the intellect ? (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscent ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES SOMETHING OF NECESSITY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei v.*) that if anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph. viii.*), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (*De Anima iii.*), *the will is in the reason.* Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be of necessity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xiii.*) that *all desire happiness with one will.* Now if this were not neces-

sary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.

I answer that, The word *necessity* is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle ;—either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible ;—or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is *natural* and *absolute necessity*. In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained : for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called *necessity of end*, and sometimes also *utility*. On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called *necessity of coercion*.

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way : as from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness : since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and im-

movably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will, as he says himself (*ibid.*).

Reply Obj. 2. The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3. We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice does not regard the end, but the means to the end, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii.). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not belong to those things of which we are masters.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES OF NECESSITY WHATEVER IT DESIRES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :--

Objection 1. It seems that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *evil is outside the scope of the will*. Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ix.) that *animals are moved by things*

seen. Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect of necessity moves the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Retract. i.*) that *it is the will by which we sin and live well*, and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things, whatever it desires.

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His Essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. i. The will can tend to nothing except under

the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2. The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several sources the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be moved, and not of necessity from some particular one.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS A HIGHER POWER THAN THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

Obj. 2. Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and more perfect power than the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written

(1 Cor. xiii. 2) : *If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing.* Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the highest power of the soul (*Ethic.* x.).

I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: absolutely and relatively. Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. If, for instance, I were to say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is colour, though colour is nobler and simpler than sound. For, as we have said above (Q. XVI., A. 1; Q. XXVII., A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* vi.) that *good and evil*, which are objects of the will, are in things, but *truth and error*, which are objects of the intellect, are in

the mind. When, therefore, the thing in which is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood, by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Reply Obj. 1. The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply Obj. 2. What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply Obj. 3. This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL MOVES THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*), and also the

Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

Obj. 3. Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.): *It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list.* But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: Firstly, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and whatever impels moves whatever is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (*Eadmerus, De Similitudinibus*). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule

moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of colour, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect may be considered in two ways : as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways : according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power ; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained

in the notion of truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in the notion of good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counsel and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect—namely, God—as also Aristotle says (*Eth. Eudemic. vii.*), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE SHOULD DISTINGUISH IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE PARTS IN THE SUPERIOR APPETITE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscent parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscent power is so called from *concupiscere* (*to desire*), and the irascible part from *irasci* (*to be angry*). But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (*Wisd. vi. 21*) : *The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom.* There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome says on *Matt. xiii. 23* that *we may be said to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part.* Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscent parts in the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.

Obj. 2. Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscent, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects

are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and a concupiscent power to the intellectual part.

Obj. 3. Further, it is said (*De Spiritu et Anima*) that *the soul has these powers*—namely, the irascible, concupiscent, and rational—*before it is united to the body*. But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., AA. 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscent powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*) says that *the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible*, and Damascene says the same (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.). And the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the will is in the reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger, or desire and animus*.

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscent are no parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above, a power which is ordered to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something coloured, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of colour : but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something coloured, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good : for the concupiscent regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature : whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intel-

lectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers; so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscent power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.

Reply Obj. 1. Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.

Reply Obj. 2. The will itself may be said to be irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscent on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscent are charity and hope—that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (*De Spiritu et Anima*); that the irascible and concupiscent powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.

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QUESTION LXXXIII.

OF FREE-WILL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now inquire concerning free-will, and there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether man has free-will ? (2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit ? (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive ? (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN HAS FREE-WILL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills ; for it is written (Rom. vii. 19) : *For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do.* Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power : for it is written (Rom. ix. 16) : *It is not of him that willeth—namely, to will—nor of him that runneth—namely, to run.* Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 3. Further, what is *free is cause of itself*, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. i.*). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. xxi. 1) : *The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord ; whithersoever He will He shall turn it* ; and (Phil. ii. 13) : *It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.* Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 4. Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (*Jer. x. 23*): *The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk.* Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii.*): *According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.* But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

On the contrary, It is written (*Eccl. xv. 14*): *God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel;* and the gloss adds: *That is of his free-will.*

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as it necessary that man has a free-will, as he is rational.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. LXXXI., A. 3 ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, *not to desire anything against the dictate of reason*, as Augustine explains this passage.

Reply Obj. 2. Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.

Reply Obj. 3. Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply Obj. 4. *Man's way* is said *not to be his* in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

Reply Obj. 5. Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXXII., AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any affection whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot

affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. LXXXI., A. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FREE-WILL IS A POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is defined as *the faculty of the will and reason*. But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (*De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*) that free-will is *the soul's habit freely disposing of itself*. Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that *man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself*. Therefore free-will is not a power.

On the contrary, Nothing but a power is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

I answer that, According to the proper signification of the (Latin) word (*arbitrium*, judgment) free-will (*liberum arbitrium*) denominates an act—yet in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. Now, that it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is no natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. LXXXII., A. 1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that *by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions* (*Ethic.* ii.); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary habit ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good or evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply Obj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in

the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as it signifies a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit : for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or to act ill.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and misery. Of which we shall see later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FREE-WILL IS AN APPETITIVE POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) says that *free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature*. But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the principal function of the free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii.) that choice is *the desire of those things which are in us*. But desire is an act of the appetitive power : therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.

I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice : for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another ; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the

nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (*Ethic.* vi.) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either *an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite*. But (*Ethic.* iii.) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he denominates choice as *a desire proceeding from counsel*.

* And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1. The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, firstly, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptance of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii.) says that, *having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel*. And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will (*liberum arbitrium*) takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3. This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FREE-WILL IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM THE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) that Θελησις is one thing and βουλησις another. But Θελησις is the will, while βουλησις seems to be the free-will, because βουλησις, according to him, is the will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 2. Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because *the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end* (*Ethic.* iii.). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* iii.) free-will is nothing else than the will.

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. LXIV., A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will, which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of understanding implies the simple acceptance of something ; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to reason, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another : where-

fore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for something : wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to choose is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else : wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now as in matters of knowledge, the principles are to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles : so in appetitive matters is the end to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose : and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1. $\betaον\lambdaησις$ is distinct from $\Thetaελησις$ on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2. Choice and will—that is, the act of willing—are different acts : yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.

QUESTION LXXXIV.

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers : for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals ; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order : Firstly, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body ; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

Concerning the former of these inquiries, there will be three points of treatment : (1) How the soul understands bodies, which are beneath it. (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself. (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.

In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered : (1) Through what does the soul know them ? (2) How and in what order does it know them ? (3) What does it know in them ?

Concerning the first, there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect ? (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species ? (3) If through some species, whether

the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul ? (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms ? (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands ? (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses ? (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms ? (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL KNOWS BODIES THROUGH THE INTELLECT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1.—It seems that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (*Soliloq. ii.*) that bodies cannot be understood by the intellect : nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses. He says also (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies ; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.

I answer, In order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things,

thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon : according to the saying of Heraclitus, that *it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent*, as the Philosopher relates (*Metaph.* iv.).

After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called *species* or *ideas*, by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. So therefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate : so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof.

Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. Firstly, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from them essentially : so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.

Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same

manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility : which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity : for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.

But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another : for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another : in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the colour of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies : for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows by understanding bodies, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species ; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxii.), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things ; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not

extend to those things that belong to the higher power ; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power.

Reply Obj. 3. Every movement presupposes something immovable : for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved : and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable ; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS THROUGH ITS ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.) that the soul *collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul : for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance.* But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the soul, after a fashion, is everything.* Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xii.). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix.) that *the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily*

senses. But the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that *like is known by like*. But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. But the Platonists were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by its principles; they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire ; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.

But this opinion will not hold. Firstly, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown *Metaph.* ix. : wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul the natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like ; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (*De Anima* i.). Secondly,

because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge ; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.

We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower : for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 3) : while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially ; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially, as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence : but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of

bodies. To the formation of which images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes such images from itself ; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image ; but just as we say that a body is made into something coloured because of its being informed with colour. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul *keeps something*—namely, not informed with such image—*which is able freely to judge of the species of these images*: and that this is the *mind* or *intellect*. And he says that the part which is informed with these images—namely, the imagination—is *common to us and beasts*.

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers ; he said that the soul is all things, *after a fashion*, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3. Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of all.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS THROUGH INNATE SPECIES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension, that *man has understanding in common with the angels*. But angels understand all things through innate species : wherefore in the book *De Causis* it is said that *every intelligence is full of forms*. Therefore the soul also

has innate species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

Obj. 3. Further, no one can answer the truth but concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in an orderly fashion, as we find related in the *Meno* of Plato, concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge, which would not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (*De Anima* iii.) that it is like *a tablet on which nothing is written.*

I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be to that form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action : for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act ;—through the action of sensible objects on his senses, so that he (actually) feels ;—by instruction or discovery, so that he (actually) understands. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of feeling, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (*ibid.*) held that the intellect by which the soul understands, has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes

unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards ; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. Firstly, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof : for no man forgets what he knows naturally, that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and suchlike. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1) : for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense, is wanting also : for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colours. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.

Reply Obj. 1. Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection : just as the lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*), have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has not : whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above (Q. LXVI., A. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature ; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Reply Obj. 2. Primary matter has substantial being

through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form : else it would not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species ; and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting ; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ARE DERIVED BY THE SOUL FROM CERTAIN SEPARATE FORMS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially ; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates in the thing understood : for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some separate forms.

Obj. 2. Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by which we feel, are caused by the

sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.

On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called *per se* man, and the form or idea of a horse which he called *per se* horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individual stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived

therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas.

But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways (*Metaph.* vi.), Avicenna (*De Anima* v.) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the *active intelligence*, from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the *active intelligence*. They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul.

But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body.

But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way excited by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles : even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this excitation does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body : and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is roused to turn to the *active intelligence* from which it receives the species : neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the *active intelligence*, it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colours ; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.

Reply Obj. 1. The intelligible species which fall to the share of our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the forms of sensible and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. vii.*).

Reply Obj. 2. Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul as we have said (Q. LXXIX., A. 4); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS MATERIAL THINGS IN THE ETERNAL TYPES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal types : for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is *united to God as to the unknown*, as Dionysius says (*Myst. Theolog.* i.). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Rom. i. 20) that *the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made*. But among the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.

Obj. 3. Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (*lib. 83 qqu.*) that *ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind*. If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Confess. xii.*) : *If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me : but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds.* Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii.) : If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens. Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it : and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter ; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our intellect knows all things : so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things should subsist of themselves outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that self-subsisting (*per se*) life or self-subsisting (*per se*) wisdom are creative substances, as Dionysius relates (*Div. Nom.* xi.) ; therefore Augustine (*lib. 83 qqu.*), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.

When, therefore, the question is asked : Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types ? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways. Firstly, as in an object itself known ; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types : but thus the blessed know all things in the eternal types, for they see God, and all things in Him. Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge : thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal

types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (*Ps. iv. 6, 7*), *Many say ; who sheweth us good things ?* which question the Psalmist answers, *The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us*, as though he were to say : By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things ; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Trin. iv.*) : *Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to their eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each ? Did they not seek for this information by the science of times and places ?*

But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their *eternal types* or in *the unchangeable truth*, as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (*lib. 83 qqu.*)—viz., that *not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision*, namely, of the eternal types, *but only those that are holy and pure*, such as the souls of the blessed.

From what has been said the objections are easily solved.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE IS DERIVED FROM SENSIBLE THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (*lib. 83 qqu.*) that *we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses*

of the body. This he proves in two ways. Firstly, because, whatever we perceive through the body, is continually being changed ; and what is never the same cannot be perceived. Secondly, because, whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as we see in those who are asleep or beside themselves with anger ; but we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object, or the deceptive images thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit. And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*), *We must not think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action ; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on.* Whence he concludes that *the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself.* Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

Obj. 3. Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things : for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Metaph. i.* ; *Poster. ii.*) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.

I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that *all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls*, as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus. And Aristotle says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*) that Democritus held that knowledge is caused by a *discharge of images*. And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (*De Anima iii.*). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible,

they thought that all our knowledge is effected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses : and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above (AA. 4, 5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible : but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) where he says that the *body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without.* Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things ; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.

But Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the co-operation of the body ; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the *composite*. And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the *composite*, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense : not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation

is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from *De Gener.* i. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's co-operation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation, according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for *the agent is more noble than the patient*, as he says himself (*ibid.*). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Q. LXXIX., AA. 3, 4), causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

Reply Obj. 1. Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because *the agent is more noble than the patient*. And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according

to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination is an action of the *composite*, there is no difficulty ; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in as far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality, as the object actually coloured, to the pupil which is potentially coloured. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since *fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation* (*De Anima* iii.), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.

Reply Obj. 3. Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND
THROUGH THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES OF WHICH IT IS
POSSESSED, WITHOUT TURNING TO THE PHANTASMS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.

Obj. 2. Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.

Obj. 3. There are no phantasms of incorporeal things : for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it

cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false : for we understand truth, and God, and the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the soul understands nothing without a phantasm*.

I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a possible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. And of this there are two indications. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy ; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in a case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter ; and through such natures of visible things it rises

to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter : for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form ; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual ; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.

Reply Obj. 1. The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice ; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals.

Reply Obj. 2. Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing ; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does.

Reply Obj. 3. Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth ; and God, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. i.*), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLECT IS HINDERED
THROUGH SUSPENSION OF THE SENSITIVE POWERS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

Obj. 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in *De Somn. et Vig.* and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin ; as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.

I answer that, As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known ; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (*De Cœl. iii.*), that *as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses* ; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife ; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife : and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge

perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporationes and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in *De Somn. et Vig.* And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep, in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.

QUESTION LXXXV.

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Concerning this there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms ? (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands ? (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal ? (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time ? (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division ? (6) Whether the intellect can err ? (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another ? (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL AND MATERIAL THINGS BY ABSTRACTION FROM PHANTASMS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phasm, there will be error in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can

be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul, what colour is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from colour, but by colour impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) there are two things in the intellectual soul—the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to colour; since light does not abstract anything from colour, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) says that *the intellect understands the species in the phantasm*; and not, therefore, by abstraction.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *things are intelligible in proportion as they are separable from matter*. Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, namely, the sense. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And

since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter ; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter : for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place : for it is not the act of an organ ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms ; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas ; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating in things abstract, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Abstraction may occur in two ways : Firstly, by way of composition and division ; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration ; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract from one another things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really

abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understand or say that colour does not exist in a coloured body, or is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider colour and its properties, without reference to the apple which is coloured ; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to colour, and therefore colour can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm ; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word *otherwise* refers to the thing understood ; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is ; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word *otherwise* be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing : since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and *signate* or individual ; common, such as flesh and bone ; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The in-

tellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from *this flesh and these bones*, which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (*Metaph.* vii.), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from *flesh and bones*. But mathematical species can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like. But intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. But they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted from common intelligible matter, such as *being, unity, power, act*, and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the two-fold kind of abstraction, as above explained, he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Reply Obj. 3. Colours, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: and therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression

on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm ; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Reply Obj. 4. Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm ; it does more ; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.

Reply Obj. 5. Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ABSTRACTED FROM THE PHANTASM IS RELATED TO OUR INTELLECT AS THAT WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in

the one who understands : since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.

Obj. 2. Further, what is actually understood must be in something ; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul : for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*i Peri. i.*), that *spoken words are signs of the passions in the soul.* But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul, viz., the intelligible species, are what is actually understood.

On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them ; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. Firstly, because the things we understand are the objects of science ; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul ; in accordance with the teaching of the Platonists who taught that all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that *whatever*

seems, is true, and that consequently contradictions are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems, according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such ; and so every judgment will be true ; for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly ; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true ; for each would judge according to his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true ; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands : which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (*Metaph. ix.*), one which remains in the agent, for instance, to see and to understand, and another which passes into an external object, for instance, to heat and to cut ; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated ; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing ; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily ; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that *like is known by like*. For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself ; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (*De Anima iii.*), who says

that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone ; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1. The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness ; and it is in this sense that we say that *the thing actually understood is the intellect in act*, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood ; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. In these words *the thing actually understood* there is a double implication :—the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words *abstract universal* imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals ; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this in the senses. For the sight sees the colour of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the colour which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the colour which is seen is only in the apple : but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of colour and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man ; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing,

or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species ; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition ; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves ; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORE UNIVERSAL IS FIRST IN OUR INTELLECTUAL COGNITION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition : for what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because *that is first from which the consequence of existence does not reciprocate* (*Categor.* ix.). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the composite precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Phys.* i.), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as *animal* is part of the definition of *man*. Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us.

Obj. 4. Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us.

On the contrary, We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual (*Phys.* i.).

I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some

degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (*Phys.* i.), that *What is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements.* Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the *universal* whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the *integral* whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to know *animal* indistinctly is to know it as *animal*; whereas to know *animal* distinctly is to know it as *rational* or *irrational animal*; that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows *animal* before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before

it is seen to be Socrates or Plato ; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore *children at first call all men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others* (*Phys.* i.). The plain reason of this lies in the fact that he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction ; as he who knows *genus* is in a state of potentiality as regards *difference*. Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.

We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal ; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common.

Reply Obj. 1. The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality—viz., the relation of one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (*De Anima* i.) that the *universal animal is either nothing or something secondary*. But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature : one, by way of generation and time ; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature ; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal ; for *the animal is generated before man*, as the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* ii.). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature : for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect

to the imperfect ; and thus the less common comes naturally before the more common ; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal, but goes on to the generation of man.

Reply Obj. 2. The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in *animal* is contained not only *man* but also *horse*. As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more ; as *man* contains not only *animal* but also *rational*. Therefore *animal* in itself comes into our knowledge before *man* ; but *man* comes before *animal* considered as part of the same idea.

Reply Obj. 3. A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself ; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly, as belonging to a certain whole ; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known ; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.

Reply Obj. 4. The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way a principle of knowledge, in as far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought : since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (*Metaph. vii.*). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of

a formal principle in regard to the singulare : for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal : thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus : because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary : since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE CAN UNDERSTAND MANY THINGS AT THE SAME TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same time.

Obj. 2. Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance, colour and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time.

Obj. 4. Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (*De Anima* i.), and the same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things at the same time.

On the contrary, It is said (*Topic.* ii.) that *understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many*.

I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say, by *one* but not by *many* intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever the intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colours or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (*Gen. ad lit.* viii.), that *God moves the spiritual creature through time*.

Reply Obj. 2. Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither

can any forms belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colours and shapes.

Reply Obj. 3. Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly; thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4. If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both of them in relation to their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

Obj. 2. Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, and also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition is true, for *man* is truly what *animal* is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division.

On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (*Peri. i.*). But in

words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmation and negation. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees; so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence.¹ Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing what an object is they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division, and reasoning. But the Divine and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

Reply Obj. 1. Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said (A. 1, and Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involves time.

Reply Obj. 3. The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according

to the thing's mode. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect ; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form to matter ; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part : for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second composition is of accident to subject : and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say *the man is white*. Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things ; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that *man* and *whiteness* are identical, but the assertion, *the man is white*, means that *the man is something having whiteness* : and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter : for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature ; rational, that which has an intellectual nature ; man, that which has both ; and Socrates, that which has all these things together with individual matter ; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing to another.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE FALSE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect can be false ; for the Philosopher says (*Metaph. vi.*) that *truth and falsehood are in the mind*. But the mind and intellect are the same,

as is shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.

Obj. 2. Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood : for *those err that work evil* (Prov. xiv. 22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Qqu.* 83), that *everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived*. And the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), that *the intellect is always true*.

I answer that, The Philosopher (*ibid.*) compares intellect with sense in this respect. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to colour ; save accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ—for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill-humours. Sense, however, may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure ; when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the colour being the same. The reason of this is evident ; for every faculty is, as such, directed to its own proper object ; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is the *quiddity* of a material thing ; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity ; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in ordering one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood as soon as the terms thereof are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle ; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible ; as, for instance, to describe anything as a *rational winged animal*. Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said *Metaph. ix.*

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the *second objection* concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the *third objection*, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE PERSON CAN UNDERSTAND ONE AND THE
SAME THING BETTER THAN ANOTHER CAN ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (*Qqu. 83*), *Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all.* Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect : and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing : nor can one person understand a thing better than another can.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between

thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.

I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word *more* be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (*loc. cit.*). In another sense the word *more* can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (*De Anima ii.*), that *it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt mind.* Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imagina-

tive, cogitative and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand.

The *reply to the first objection* is clear from the above; likewise the *reply to the second*, for the truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply Obj. 3. The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, does not cause a specific but only a numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS THE INDIVISIBLE BEFORE THE DIVISIBLE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (*Phys. i.*), that we *understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements*. But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible.

Obj. 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for *definition proceeds from the first and more known*, as is said *Topic. vi.* But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for Euclid says *a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points*; also unity comes into the definition of number, for *number is multitude measured by one*, as is said *Metaph. x.* Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.

Obj. 3. Further, *Like is known by like*. But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because *the intellect is simple* (*De Anima iii.*). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible.

On the contrary, It is said (*ibid.*) that *the indivisible is expressed as a privation*. But privation is known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said *De Anima* iii. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (*ibid.*); and again before the intellect composes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation *as that which has no parts*: and in like manner the notion of *one* is that it is *indivisible*, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. x.*). And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that such indivisible is understood primarily: for according to the Platonists what is first (of itself) is first by participation in things.

Reply Obj. 1. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes.¹ But in perfect knowledge, the

knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: *Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes.*

Reply Obj. 2. A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited.—Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply Obj. 3. The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore priority of knowledge is not in proportion to likeness of the nature (known) to the cognitive power, but according to its aptitude as object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather than colour.

QUESTION LXXXVI.

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

- WE now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things ; concerning which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether it knows singulars ? (2) Whether it knows the infinite ? (3) Whether it knows contingent things ? (4) Whether it knows future things ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS SINGULARS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition ; *Socrates is a man* ; for it is the intellect that forms a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, *Socrates*.

Obj. 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the singular.

Obj. 3. Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own ; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.

Obj. 4. Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Phys.* i.), that *the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense*.

I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as we have said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 1), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflexion, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said *De Anima* iii. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition, *Socrates is a man*. Wherefore *the reply to the first objection* is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said *Ethic.* vii. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said *De Anima* iii.

Reply Obj. 3. To be understood is repugnant to the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no repugnance in its being understood.

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above (Q. XII., A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things.

Obj. 2. Further our intellect can naturally know *genus* and *species*. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things.

Obj. 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said (Q. LXXVI., A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

On the contrary, It is said (*Phys. i.*) that the *infinite, considered as such, is unknown.*

I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said *ibid. iii.* Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.

On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (*ibid.* iii.) : for the infinite is that *from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken*. Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted : which is impossible.

For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite : because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration : since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said *Ethic.* ii. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge : which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. VII., A. 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter ; whereas in material things, the term *infinite* is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known ; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2. The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms ; therefore it cannot know

actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles ; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply Obj. 3. If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively ; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time : and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.

Reply Obj. 4. As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW CONTINGENT THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect cannot know contingent things, because, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi.), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things.

Obj. 2. Further, he says (*Phys.* iv.), *what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time*. Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.

On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will ;

and, again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.

I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways ; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity : since every contingent thing has in it something necessary ; for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent ; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter ; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle : whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object ; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above (*ibid.*). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect ; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE FUTURE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the *here and now*, and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.

Obj. 2. Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future.

Obj. 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future, as we see in the frequent cawing of crows, foretelling rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. viii. 6, 7), *There is great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past, and things to come, he cannot know by any messenger.*

I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflexion only, as stated above (A. 1). But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge (Q. XIV., A. 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these

the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*Confess.* xii.), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future ; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating in the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body ; and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.

But as this kind of knowledge is not natural to our intellect, for by its nature it receives knowledge from the senses, therefore it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses : rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes ; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events ; or, by the influence of demons. when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above (Q. LVII., A. 3). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses. as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.—The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because (*De Somn. et Vig.* ii.) *impressions made by day are evanescent.*

The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen.

Reply Obj. 3. Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animal's movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (*ibid.*), that *some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety, moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.*

QUESTION LXXXVII.

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. About this there arise four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence ? (2) Whether it knows its own habits ? (3) How does the intellect know its own act ? (4) How does it know the act of the will ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF BY ITS ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (*De Trin. ix.*), that *the mind knows itself by itself, because it is incorporeal*.

Obj. 2. Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.

Obj. 3. Further, *in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same* (*De Anima iii.*). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind ; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.

On the contrary, It is said (*De Anima* iii.) that the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things. But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.

I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (*Metaph.* ix.): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually coloured. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated *Phys.* i. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence, according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God knows Himself by His own Essence, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as *act*, but not as a *pure act*, nor as a *complete act*, and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called *possible*.* Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below

* *Possibilis*,—elsewhere in this translation rendered 'passive.'—ED.

what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating in separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 5). Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix.) ; *We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.* There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.), concerning such mental inquiry; *Let not the mind strive to see itself as if it were absent, but discern itself as present—i.e., in order to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.*

Reply Obj. 1. The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act :—because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident ; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as colour is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.

Reply Obj. 2. The essence of an angel is as an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself : not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things,—as is the passive intellect, or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms,—as is the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in *things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same*, is equal to saying that *as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same*. For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn : since the essences of some things are immaterial,—as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (*De Anima* iii.) that the proposition quoted is true of separate substances, only as in a sense verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (*Reply Obj.* 2).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS THE HABITS OF THE SOUL BY THEIR ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (*De Trin. xiii.*), *Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body ; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence* ; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.

Obj. 3. Further, *whatever is the cause of a thing being such must be still more such.* But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.

On the contrary, Habits are the principles of acts, as are likewise the faculties. But as is said (*De Anima ii.*), acts and operations are logically prior to faculties. Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits, and thus habits, like the faculties, are known by their acts.

I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as it is actual : therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act ; as, for example, when anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit ; or when he inquires into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its

presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, still it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.

Reply Obj. 2. Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object [since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7)], but as that by which it understands.

Reply Obj. 3. The axiom, *whatever is the cause of a thing being such, must be still more such*, is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause ; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true : for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge ; nor are things known by reason of the habit, as by reason of an object known, but as by reason of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows. Therefore the argument does not prove.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS ITS OWN ACT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act ; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated *De Anima* ii. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.), *I understand that I understand.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1 and 2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation : for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built ; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said *Metaph.* ix. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. But this occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. LIV., AA. 1, 2), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act ; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which is neither its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing.

And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known ; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (*De Anima* ii.).

Reply Obj. 1. The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, *being* and *the true*, in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true ; but *being* and *true*, as considered in material things, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.

Reply Obj. 2. The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and the intelligent act could be understood by one act ; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone ; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. The proper sense feels by reason of the change in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot make a change in itself ; but one material object is changed by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material change of an organ ; and so there is no comparison.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS THE ACT OF
THE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect ; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Obj. 3. Augustine (*Confess. x.*) says of the soul's affections that *they are known neither by images as bodies are known ; nor by their presence, like the arts ; but by certain notions.* Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things, but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to know such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. x.*), *I understand that I will.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LIX., A. 1), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood ; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence ; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly ; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly, as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus

(*De Anima* iii.),—that *the will is in the reason*. Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by him. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as anyone knows that he wills ; and inasmuch as he knows the nature of this act, and consequently knows the nature of the principle which is the habit or faculty.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct faculties ; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The *good* and the *true* which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above (Q. LXXXII., A. 4 ad 1, and Q. XVI., A. 4 ad 1) ; for the true is good, and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies ; nor by being present, as the arts are in their subject ; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which is possessed of some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.

QUESTION LXXXVIII.

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz., immaterial substances ; and here we have three points of inquiry : (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves ? (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things ? (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IN THE PRESENT STATE OF LIFE CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES IN THEMSELVES ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (*De Trin.* ix.) says, *As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things.* But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances.

Obj. 2. Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things ; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). As our mind, therefore, understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things.

Obj. 3. Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object as is stated *De Anima* iii. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things.

Obj. 4. Further, the Commentator says (*Metaph.* ii.) that, *nature would be frustrated in its end* were we unable to understand abstract substances, because it would have made what *in itself is naturally intelligible* not to be understood at all. But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Obj. 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. ix. 16), *The things that are in heaven who shall search out?* But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to Matthew xviii. 10, *Their angels in heaven*, etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.

I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called *Ideas*, are the proper objects of our intellect, and are thus firstly and of themselves understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.

But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things ; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and of themselves be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.

Nevertheless Averroës (*Comment. De Anima* iii.) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by the continuity or union of some separate substance apart from ourselves, which he calls the *active intellect*, and which, being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus.—For since we understand both by means of the active intellect and by means of intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood ; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways ; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw ; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together ; and the more numerous the intelligible objects

received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is corruptible);—but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect.

This opinion, however, is untrue. Firstly, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect (Q. LXX., A. 1). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just as when we see colours set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colours. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things

would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances.

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things : and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity ; which is against what the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i.), that happiness is a *kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue*. Further, it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species.

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (*Ethic.* i.), that happiness is *operation according to perfect virtue* ; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he names as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science, and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined.

Sixthly, as was shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 4), the active intellect is not a separate substance ; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively ; because, as is stated (*De Anima* iii.), the passive intellect is *all things potentially*, and the active intellect is *all things in act*. Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal sub-

stances, such as is within its compass ; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge ; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true—that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms : and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances.

Reply Obj. 3. There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge ; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being disproportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are disproportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Reply Obj. 4. This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. Firstly, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect ; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another.

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances : while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.

Reply Obj. 5. Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES THROUGH ITS KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* i.) that *the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.* Therefore we can be led to know immaterial substances by material things.

Obj. 2. Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances ; for Damascene defines an angel (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) ; and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Obj. 3. Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material effects.

Obj. 4. Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.) that *intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal.*

I answer that, Averroës says (*De Anima* iii.) that a philosopher named Avempace taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances. For as the nature of our intellect is to abstract

the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction ; and as the process of abstraction cannot go on for ever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter ; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance.

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things ; as the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that, however much our intellect abstracted the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances.

Reply Obj. 1. From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof ; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* ii.).

Reply Obj. 2. Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (*De Cœl.* i.) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity ; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things.

Reply Obj. 3. The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its own power and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act nor through any other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former.

Reply Obj. 4. Created immaterial substances are not in the

same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in matter ; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus ; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. III., A. 5). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature ; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE FIRST OBJECT KNOWN BY THE HUMAN MIND ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we judge others, is our first known object ; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. and *De Vera Rel.* xxxi.). Therefore God is the first object known to us.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge ; for *He was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world* (John i. 9). Therefore God is our first and most known object.

Obj. 3. Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii.). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.

On the contrary, No man hath seen God at any time (John i. 18).

I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present

state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1), much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said that God is not the first object of our knowledge ; but rather that we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom. i. 20), *the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* But the first object of our knowledge in this life is the *quiddity of a material thing*, which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7 ; Q. LXXXV., A. 8 ; Q. LXXXVII., A. 2 ad 2).

Reply Obj. 1. We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above, (Q. XII., A. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, but the medium whereby it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The axiom, *Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so*, must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as explained above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 2 ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God ; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3. If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect ; hence the argument does not prove.

QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now consider the knowledge of the soul separated (from the body), concerning which there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether the soul separate from the body can understand ? (2) Whether it understands separate substances ? (3) Whether it understands all natural things ? (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars ? (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain ? (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired ? (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge ? (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL CAN UNDERSTAND ANYTHING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*), that *the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle*. But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 7, 8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have

shown above (Q. LXXVII., A. 8). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing.

Obj. 3. Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such ; being at first *like a tablet on which nothing is written* ; nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species ; nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the soul ; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all ; nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*), *If the soul had no proper operation of its own, it could not be separated from the body.* But the soul is separated from the body ; therefore it has a natural operation of its own, and above all it has intelligence. Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.

I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature itself, but from the accidental fact of its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish ; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it ; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of the matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires

it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing ; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.

To solve the difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same ; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, whether it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and then in another place, unnatural to it. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs ; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body ; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it ; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best (and it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms), it might seem that God would so order the soul's nature as to make the nobler way of understanding natural to it, and not to bind it down for that purpose to the body. In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we con-

sider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things ; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures : whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, these inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality, as the superior substances, their knowledge would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intelligences. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed human souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves ; as we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples. It is thus clear that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for

it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that to understand is a movement of body and soul as united, just as to feel is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. And this is the sense of the second objection.

Reply Obj. 3. When the soul is separated from the body, it does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves ; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances ; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL UNDERSTANDS SEPARATE SUBSTANCES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature ; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances, as shown above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul ; nor by means of species

abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone ; which cannot reasonably be said.

On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls ; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke xvi. 23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Trin. ix.*), *our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself—i.e., by knowing itself* (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1 ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms ; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). But when it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects ; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. But every separate substance *understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance* : for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands ; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. Now the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel ; but is the same as that of other separated souls ; therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 1. The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect

considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body : but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.

Reply Obj. 2. The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas ; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Reply Obj. 3. Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances ; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS ALL NATURAL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul ; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (*De Summo Bono i.*). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.

Further, if the soul as soon as separated gained knowledge of all natural things, the efforts of men to know would be

vain and profitless. But this would be unreasonable. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul understands by means of species received from the influence of the Divine light, like the angels. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.

Reply Obj. 1. Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.

Reply Obj. 2. As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.

Reply Obj. 3. Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating only of natural knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4. Knowledge here acquired by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak here is confused. Hence it does not follow at all that to study in order to learn is useless.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS SINGULARS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.

Obj. 3. Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said, *I have five brothers* (Luke xvi. 28).

I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q. XIV., A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things ; whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect,

through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species ; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order ; because whatever is received into anything is received according to the disposition of the subject receiving it.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction ; neither does the separated soul know it thus, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of the separated soul is determined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HABIT OF KNOWLEDGE HERE ACQUIRED
REMAINS IN THE SEPARATED SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body : for the Apostle says : *Knowledge shall be destroyed* (1 Cor. xiii. 8).

Obj. 2. Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better ; which seems unreasonable.

Obj. 3. Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it

would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject, which cannot be.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says (*Prædic. vi.*), that *a habit is a quality hard to remove : but sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like.* But there is no change in this life like that of death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*Ep. ad Paulinum*), *Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven.*

I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is *the abode of species*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers, and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For *habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired* (*Ethic. ii.*). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received : and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.

Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers ; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain ; because, as the Philosopher

says (*De Long. et Brev. Vitæ*), a form may be corrupted, first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold ; and, secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. LXXIX., A. 2 ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary ; for there is no contrary to the meaning of intelligible things, above all as regards simple intelligence of *what a thing is*. But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning ; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly : namely, *forgetfulness* on the part of the memorative power, and *deception* on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing ; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, *I know in part*.

Reply Obj. 2. As a moderately good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.

Reply Obj. 3. These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.

Reply Obj. 4. This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED HERE
REMAINS IN THE SEPARATED SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima i.*), that *when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves.* But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.

Obj. 2. Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic. ii.*), that *habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired.* But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms : therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life.

On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Luke xvi. 25), *Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.*

I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration—its *species* and its *mode*. Its *species* comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude ; whereas the *mode* is gathered from the power of the agent ; as, for example, that anyone sees a stone, is due to the species of the stone in his eye ; but the fact that he sees it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible

species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way ; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul ; not by diversity of species.

Reply Obj. 3. The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurabley, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurabley.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LOCAL DISTANCE IMPEDES THE KNOWLEDGE IN THE SEPARATED SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (*De Cura Mort.* xiii.), that *the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here*. But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Divin. Daemon.* iii.), that *the demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us*. But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance ; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's.

Obj. 3. Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (*Luke xvi. 23*), that Dives, *lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off.* Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.

I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge ; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible, because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are *there*, as if impeded by local distance ; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (*A. 8*).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from *De Civ. Dei xxi.*

Reply Obj. 3. The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SEPARATED SOULS KNOW WHAT TAKES PLACE
ON EARTH ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that separated souls know what takes place on earth ; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke xvi. 27, 28), *I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments.* Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.

Obj. 2. Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place here ; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings xxviii. 11), but this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.

Obj. 3. Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance ; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv. 21), *He will not understand whether his children come to honour or dishonour.*

I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances ; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus : *The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh ; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge* (*Moral. xii.*). Augustine seems to say the same

(*De Cura Mort.* xiii.), when he asserts that, *the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living.*

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted : *The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.* But Augustine (*De Cura Mort.* xiii.) expressly says : *The dead, even the saints, do not know what is done by the living or by their own children,* as a gloss quotes on the text, *Abraham hath not known us* (Isa. lxiii. 16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited or consoled in sadness by his mother, as when she was alive ; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state ; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kings xxii. 20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt ; and premises, *Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say.* Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, *We cannot believe.* His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one,—that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sadness, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.

Reply to Obj. 1. The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state ; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but by souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by the *revelation of the Holy Ghost*, as Augustine says in the same book.

Reply Obj. 2. That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God ;

in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living ;—and this is to be accounted as miraculous : or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed ; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through a Divine revelation ; according to the words (*Eccl. xlvi. 23*), *he slept, and told the king the end of his life* : or else this apparition was procured by the demons ; unless, indeed, the authority of *Ecclesiasticus* be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.

Reply Obj. 3. This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned in this article.

QUESTION XC.

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment : (1) The production of man himself. (2) The end of this production. (3) The state and condition of the first man. (4) The place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered : (1) The production of man's soul. (2) The production of man's body. (3) The production of the woman.

As to the first there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance ? (2) Whether, if made, it was created ? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality ? (4) Whether it was made before the body ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL WAS MADE, OR WAS OF GOD'S
SUBSTANCE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul was not made, but was of God's substance. For it is written (Gen. ii. 7): *God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul.* But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.

Obj. 2. Further, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore

the soul is a pure act ; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.

Obj. 3. Further, things that exist and do not differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Orig. Animæ* iii.) lays down certain opinions which he calls *exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith*, among which the first is the opinion that *God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself*.

I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LXXVII., A. 2; Q. LXXIX., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence,—acquires its knowledge somehow from things,—and has various powers ; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act,—receives nothing from any other,—and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. III., A. 1, 7; Q. IX., A. 1).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated *De Anima* i., it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichæans, thinking that God was a corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light, bound up with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body ; so that Varro said, *God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason*, as

Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* vii.). So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world ; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. III., A. 1, 8 ; and Q. LXXV., A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.

Reply Obj. 1. The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense ; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (*spirare*), is the same as to *make a spirit*. Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5 ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.

Reply Obj. 3. That which differs, differs in something ; wherefore we seek for the difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound ; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse ; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational ; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL WAS PRODUCED BY CREATION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter ; and was not created.

Obj. 2. Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. And then no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i.) : *God created man to His own image.* But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.

I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said *Metaph.* vii. that we should speak of an accident rather as *of something* than as *something*. The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. But the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter,—whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being,—or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal ele-

ment ; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain ; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body ; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.

Reply Obj. 2. The production of the form from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actual that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, but is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. LXXV., A. 2) ; therefore it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.

Reply Obj. 3. As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL IS PRODUCED BY GOD IMMEDIATELY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things ; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But *inferior things are forwarded by the higher*, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. v.*) ; therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels.

Obj. 3. Further, *perfect* is that which can produce its like, as is stated *Meteor.* iv. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves ; and such is the rational soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life.

I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. But God alone can create ; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything ; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 3). Now every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein ; therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.

Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior,—all these things are effected through a certain transmutation.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL WAS PRODUCED BEFORE
THE BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (Q. LXVI., A. 1 ; Q. LXX., A. 1). But the soul was made by creation ; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.

Obj. 2. Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies ; or, at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter ; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.

Obj. 3. Further, the end is proportioned to the beginning. But at the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.

On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its own proper potentiality. Therefore, since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.

I answer that, Origen (*Peri Archon* i.) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies ; because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit ; so that some of them are united to bodies—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. XLVII., A. 2) ; so we need say nothing about it here.

Augustine, however (*Gen. ad lit.* vii), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason ; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was not actually produced, but only as to some *causal virtues* (*causales rationes*) ; which cannot be said of the soul, because it was neither made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels ; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion ; as his words prove. For he says : *We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of*

the world, but that the soul was already created. Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.

Therefore, if we keep to the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (Q. LXXIV., A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels ; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.

Reply Obj. 1. If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.

Reply Obj. 2. The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.

Reply Obj. 3. That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due to the body at its first creation.

QUESTION XCI.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE have now to consider the production of the first man's body, concerning which there are four points of inquiry :—
(1) The matter from which it was produced. (2) The author by whom it was produced. (3) The disposition it received in its production. (4) The mode and order of its production.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BODY OF THE FIRST MAN WAS MADE
OF THE SLIME OF THE EARTH ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something ; because *not being* is farther off from actual existence than *being in potentiality*. But since man is the most honourable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility ; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.

Obj. 3. Further, fire and air are nobler bodies than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the

human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements.

On the contrary, It is written (*Gen. ii. 7*) : *God made man of the slime of the earth.*

I answer that, As God is perfect, He bestowed perfection on His works according to their capacity to receive them ; according to *Deut. xxxii. 4* : *God's works are perfect.* He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that *all things are pre-contained* in Him, not as component parts, but as *united in one simple whole*, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. v.*) ; in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one essence. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature come under their knowledge through various forms. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the *genus* of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament ; and as to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power ; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire ; and where there is humour, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance ; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth ; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called *a little world* (*microcosm*), because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.

Reply Obj. 1. The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in the body of man when its matter was produced by

creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in its effects.

Reply Obj. 3. If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely outside the whole *genus* of such contraries,—as, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without colour, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colours; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense:—or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as must needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium, in a fashion, is in potentiality to the extremes.

Reply Obj. 4. In the slime of the earth, are earth and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture

makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said ; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN BODY WAS IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), that corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels. But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body ; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body ; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. vii.*) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures ; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal

body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God.

On the contrary, It is written (*Eccl. xvii. 1*) : *God created man out of the earth.*

I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms ; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (*Metaph. vii.*), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q. LXV., A. 4) ; and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation : wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*). So as no pre-existing body had been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the angels render service to God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind. By this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth, yet the angels could serve God by ministering also as regards the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do so at the last resurrection, by collecting the dust.

Reply Obj. 2. Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna

imagined ; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. ii.*), *man and the sun beget man from matter*. For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other perfect animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter ; for it is clear that more conditions are required for the production of a perfect than an imperfect thing.

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of the heavens causes natural changes ; but not changes beyond the order of nature, and which are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see. Like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.

Reply Obj. 4. An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. Firstly, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only ; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous works in their causal virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BODY OF MAN WAS GIVEN AN APT DISPOSITION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man ; as dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

Obj. 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for

these are provided with covering and natural arms of defence, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

Obj. 3. Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

On the contrary, It is written (*Eccles. vii. 30*) : *God made man right.*

I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition ; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end ; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not ; as, for instance, when a man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view ; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition ; not absolutely so, but in view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (*Phys. ii.*) : *And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance.*

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations ; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God constituted the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.

Reply Obj. 1. The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal ; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other

animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses ; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man of all animals needs the largest brain as compared to the body ; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7) ; and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand up erect. So that the size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man ; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.

Reply Obj. 2. Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element ; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (*De Anima* iii.), *the organ of organs*. Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.

Reply Obj. 3. An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons ; firstly, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, for which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for

the purpose of knowledge. Wherefore, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood ; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers ; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet ; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because, if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things ; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world ; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth ; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRODUCTION OF THE HUMAN BODY
IS FITTINGLY DESCRIBED IN SCRIPTURE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, *God said; Let it be made, and it was made.* Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Obj. 2. Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, *Let us make man.*

Obj. 3. Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, *God made man of the slime of the earth,* it was not fittingly added : *And He breathed into him the breath of life.*

Obj. 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart ; therefore it was not fittingly said, *He breathed into his face the breath of life.*

Obj. 5. Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. vii.*), was made before the body. Therefore having said, *To His image He made them,* it was not fittingly added, *male and female He created them.*

On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine observes (*Gen. ad lit. vi.*), man does not surpass other things in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things ; since it is written (*Ps. ci. 26*), *The work of Thy hands is the heaven,* and elsewhere (*Ps. xciv. 5*), *His hands laid down the dry land;* but because man is made to God's image. In describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.

Reply Obj. 2. The words, *Let us make man*, are not to be understood as addressed to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply Obj. 3. Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, *God made man*, must be understood of the production of the body with the soul ; and that the subsequent words, *and He breathed into his face the breath of life*, should be understood of the Holy Ghost ; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost* (John xx. 22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiii.), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, *And man was made a living soul* ; which words the Apostle (I Cor. xv. 45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, *He breathed into his face the breath of life*, are a sort of exposition of what goes before ; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 4. Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed ; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.), the works of the six days were done all at one time ; wherefore man's soul which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made in time before the sixth day ; but on the sixth day the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made.

QUESTION XCII.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider the production of the woman, about which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things ? (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man ? (3) Whether of man's rib ? (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE
IN THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal. ii.*), that the *female is a misbegotten male*. But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production.

Obj. 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (*Gen. iii. 16*), *Thou shalt be under the man's power*; and Gregory says that, *Where there is no sin, we are all equal*. But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man : *for the agent is always more honourable than the patient*, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin.

Obj. 3. Further, occasions of sin should be *cut off*. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman.

On the contrary, It is written, *It is not good for man to be alone ; let us make him a helper like to himself* (Gen. ii. 18).

I answer that, It was necessary, as the Scripture says, for woman to be made as a help to man ; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works ; but as a help in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed ; others possess the active and passive generative power together ; as we see in plants which are generated from seed ; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed ; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition ; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united ; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man ; so that the female should be produced separately from the male ; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said, *And they shall be two in one flesh* (Gen. ii. 24).

Reply Obj. 1. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male

seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (*De Gener. Animal.* iv.). But as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is intended by nature, and ordered for the work of generation. Now the intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.

Reply Obj. 2. Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection, which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (Q. XCVI., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE FROM MAN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made

from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever are of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man.

Obj. 3. Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office ; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. xviii. 6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccl. xvii. 5) : *He created of him*, that is, out of man, *a helpmate like to himself*, that is, woman.

I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from the man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. Firstly, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that *God made the whole human race from one* (Acts xvii. 26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gen. ii. 23, 24) : *She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.* This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life ; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii.), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified

that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (*Eph. v. 32*) : *This is a great sacrament ; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.*

Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.

Reply Obj. 2. Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle ; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from a man.

Reply Obj. 3. A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. But woman was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam ; and so this argument does not prove.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WOMAN WAS FITTINGLY MADE FROM THE RIB OF MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself) ;—or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. x.*) : *A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction.* But the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's—at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.

Obj. 2. Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was

removed, his body remained imperfect ; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Obj. 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 22) : *God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman.*

I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man ; first, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither *use authority over man*, and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet ; secondly, for the sacramental signification ; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed—namely, blood and water—which were to establish the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added ; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of the matter itself, and therefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it ; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. iv.*). So to say that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictions—viz., the definition without the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter :

either by creation or, which is more probable, by conversion. So Augustine says (*Tract. xxiv., in Joan.*) that *Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn*—that is, by transformation of the food. Nevertheless, we say that God fed the crowds with the loaves, or made woman from the rib, because the addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply Obj. 2. The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begotten, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WOMAN WAS FORMED IMMEDIATELY BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Trin. iii.*) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Obj. 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ix.*). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work : God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man's rib.

I answer that, as was said above (A. 2 ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ix.*), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman ; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says in the same work : *The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus ; it made it possible for her to be thus made.* Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created ; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.

QUESTION XCIII.

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN.

(*In Nine Articles.*)

WE now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made to the *image and likeness of God*. There are on this subject nine points of inquiry : (1) Whether the image of God is in man ? (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures ? (3) Whether the image of God is better found in the angels than in man ? (4) Whether the image of God is in every man ? (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them ? (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only ? (7) Whether the image of God is in man's powers or in his habits and acts ? (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object ? (9) Of the difference between *image* and *likeness*.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isa. xl. 18) : *To whom have you likened God ? or what image will you make for Him ?*

Obj. 2. Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. i. 15) : *Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature.* Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

Obj. 3. Further, Hilary says (*De Synod.*) that *an image is of the same species as that which it represents*; and he also says that *an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another*. But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.

On the contrary, It is written (*Gen. i. 26*): *Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*Qq. 83*): *Where an image exists there forthwith there is likeness; but where there is likeness there is not necessarily an image.* Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it is copied from something else. For an *image* is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for, as Augustine says: *Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality*, as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made *to* God's likeness; for the preposition *to* signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply Obj. 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: *What image will you make for Him?* But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply Obj. 2. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the *Image*, and never *to the*

image. But man is said to be both *image* by reason of the likeness ; and to the *image* by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son ; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself : whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine explains in *De decem Chordis* (*Serm. ix. al. xcvi., De Tempore*).

Reply Obj. 3. As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him ; but when Hilary says of a thing which adequately represents another, this is to be understood of a perfect image.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL CREATURES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. ii.*) : *Effects are contingent images of their causes.* But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that *the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness.* Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man ; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called *very good* (*Gen. i. 31*). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.

Obj. 4. Further, Boëthius (*De Consol.* iii.) says of God : *Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image.* Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* vi.) : *Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field.* Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.

I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image ; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing ; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species ; thus the image of the king exists in his son : or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape ; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that *an image is of the same species.*

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist ; secondly, because they live, and thirdly because they know or understand ; and these last, as Augustine says (*Qq. 83*), *approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him.* It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.

Reply Obj. 1. Everything which is imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree of the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are *contingent images of their causes* ; that is, as much as they happen to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality ; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.

Reply Obj. 3. The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion ; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.

Reply Obj. 4. Boëthius here uses the word *image* to express the likeness which a thing of art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word *image* in this sense ; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being, as living, like to the First Life, and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE MORE TO THE IMAGE OF GOD
THAN MAN IS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon *On the Image* (xlivi.) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*Qq. 83*), *man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man.—Therefore nothing is more akin to Him.* But a creature is called God's image so far as it is

akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

Obj. 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness ; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a Homily (*in Evang. xxxiv.*) : *The angel is called a " seal of resemblance "* (Ezech. xxviii. 12) *because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.*

I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. Firstly, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LVIII., A. 3 ; Q. LXXIX., A. 8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God ; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature ; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respect man is more like to God.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God ; but not the angels.

Reply Obj. 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another ; so we say that nothing is more like to

God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, *things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer.* Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.

Reply Obj. 3. When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another ; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another ; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals according to what is more or less.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS FOUND IN EVERY MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that *man is the image of God, but woman is the image* (Vulg., glory) *of man* (1 Cor. xi. 7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says, *Whom God foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son* (Rom. viii. 29). But all men are not predestinated. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.

Obj. 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God.

On the contrary, it is written : *Surely man passeth as an image* (Ps. xxxviii. 7).

I answer that, As man is said to be to the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man

in three ways. Firstly, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God ; which aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men : secondly, inasmuch as man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly ; which kind of image is by the conformity of grace : thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly ; which is from the likeness and conformity of glory. Wherefore on the words, *The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us* (Ps. iv. 7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image, of *creation*, of *re-creation*, and of *likeness*. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1. The image of God is found both in man and in woman as regards what belongs to the essential nature of image, that is, the intellectual nature. Hence, when the inspired writer had said, *To the image of God He created him*, he added, *Male and female He created them* (Gen. i. 27). Moreover he said *them* in the plural, as Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. iii.*) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. In a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman ; for man is the beginning and end of woman ; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that *man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man*, he adds his reason for saying this, *For man is not of woman, but woman of man ; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man.*

Reply Obs. 2 and 3. These reasons refer to the image which belongs to the conformity of grace and glory.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN ACCORDING TO THE TRINITY OF PERSONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum*) : *One in essence is*

the Godhead of the Holy Trinity ; and one is the image to which man was made. And Hilary (*De Trin.* v.) says : *Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity.* Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (*De Eccl. Dogmat.*) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) that the image of God in man belongs to him as *an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.* Gregory of Nyssa (*De Homin. Opificio*, xvi.) also asserts that, when Scripture says that *man was made to the image of God*, it means that *man was made a participator of all good : for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness.* Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons ; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons ; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q. XXXII., A. 1).

Obj. 4. Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son ; for Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.) that *the Son alone is the image of the Father.* Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary. (*De Trin.* iv.) proves the plurality of the Divine Persons, from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God.

I answer that, as we have seen (Q. XL., A. 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof ; animated things being produced in one

way, and inanimate in another ; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is, in a manner, suitable to the Divine Nature ; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons ; but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons ; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (*De Trin. xv.*), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says : *We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves ; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.*

Reply Obj. 4. Some have said that in man there is an image only of the Son. Augustine rejects this opinion (*De Trin. xii.*) : firstly, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father : secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, *Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness ; but to Thy image.* When, therefore, it is written, *He made him to the image of God*, the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. But when it is written that *God made man to His image*, this can be understood in two ways, as meaning, first, that this preposition *to* points to the term of the making, so that the sense is, *Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him* : or, secondly, this preposition *to* may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, *This book is made to (the likeness*

of) that other one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another.

SIXTH ARTICLE. .

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN AS REGARDS THE MIND ONLY ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says that *a man is to the image of God* (1 Cor. xi. 7). But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written : (Gen. i. 27) *God created man to His own image ; to the image of God He created him ; male and female He created them.* But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.

Obj. 3. Further, image seems to consist principally in the shape. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not only in his mind. .

Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii.) there is a threefold vision in us, *corporeal, spiritual, or imaginary, and intellectual.* Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 23, 24) : *Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man.* Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. He says also (Col. iii. 10), *putting on the new man ; him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him Who created him,* where the renewal which

consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of *image* as we have explained above (A. 2) ; whereas in other creatures this likeness is of the character of a *trace*. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures ; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind ; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a *trace*, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a *trace*, and the way in which an *image*, represents anything. An *image* represents something by likeness in species, as we have said ; while a *trace* represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called *traces* : so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in their being and life, but also in their intellect, as above explained ; whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their nature. Likewise, as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. XXVIII., A. 3) ; so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect,

and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love ; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle ; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect ; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end ; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an *image* in his mind ; but in the other parts of his being by way of a *trace*.

Reply Obj. 1. Man is called the image of God ; not that he is essentially an image ; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind ; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that *the man represents the Person of the Father ; those born of man denote the person of the Son ; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter.* All of this is manifestly absurd ; firstly, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring ; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person ; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, *to the image of God He created him*, it added, *male and female He created them*, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (*Col. iii. 10*), after

saying, *In the image of Him who created him*, added, *Where there is neither male nor female.**

Reply Obj. 3. Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because *the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven*, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as Augustine remarks (*Qq. 83*). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply 4. Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine remarks (*De Trin. xi.*). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, there is the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the con naturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the

* These words are in reality from Gal. iii. 28. Comparison of the two passages shows this to be a possible variant of the text as read by St. Thomas.

procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ACTS
OF THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xi.*), that *man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge.* But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Trin. ix.*) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things—mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (*De Trin. x.*) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to *memory, understanding, and will.* But these three are *natural powers of the soul*, as the Master of the Sentences says (*i. Dist. 3.*). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Trin. xi.*) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.

I answer that, As above explained, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. So, if

the image of the Divine Trinity must be in the soul, we must look for it there where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But our word *cannot exist without actual thought*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word ; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, so, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply Obj. 1. Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (*De Trin.* ix.), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine observed this trinity, firstly, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves—*De Trin.* x.) ; therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will ; which everyone is conscious of possessing ; and assigns the image of the trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves (*De Trin.* xiv.), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual con-

sideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, he says, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love. But because, as he says, *A word cannot be there without actual thought* (since we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. By understanding I mean whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent. From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as also he says there. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three (distinct) powers as the Master of the Sentences asserts.

Reply Obj. 4. This might be answered by reference to what Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.), that *the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself*; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that *it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things*. Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.): *If the soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence.*

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF THE DIVINE TRINITY IS IN THE SOUL
ONLY BY COMPARISON WITH GOD AS ITS OBJECT ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above, accordingly as the word in us proceeds from the speaker ; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin. xii.*) that *when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal.* Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Obj. 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Obj. 4. The Saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision ; wherefore it is written (*2 Cor. iii. 18*) : *We are transformed into the same image from glory to glory.* But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xiv.*) : *The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by whom it was made.* Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.

I answer that, As above explained, image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the

image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above explained (AA. 6, 7), are distinguished from each other by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love from Both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself ; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love ; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, while also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. So we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways : directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately ; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.), that *the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God.* But this is due to the fact not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely ; but that it thereby, further, turns to God, as appears from the authority quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1. For the nature of an image it is not enough that something proceeds from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds ; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2. In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, *any third thing should be required to make up the trinity*, as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, *although a trinity may be found, yet the image of God is not to be seen there*, as he says

farther on ; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known, are not always present ; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life ; while in the future life faith will no longer exist ; but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply Obj. 3. The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. XII., A. 12 ; Q. LVI., A. 3 ; Q. LX., A. 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul ; *whether this image of God be so obsolete*, as it were clouded, *as almost to amount to nothing*, as in those who have not the use of reason ; or *obscured and disfigured*, as in sinners ; or *clear and beautiful*, as in the just ; as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.).

Reply Obj. 4. By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself ; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine says (*ibid.*), that *in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable* ; for in the Incarnate Word are the types of all creatures.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER " LIKENESS " IS PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED FROM
" IMAGE " ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that *likeness* is not properly distinguished from *image*. For *genus* is not properly distinguished from *species*. Now, *likeness* is to *image* as *genus* to *species* : because, *where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely* as Augustine says (Qq. 83). Therefore *likeness* is not properly to be distinguished from *image*.

Obj. 2. Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the *likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things* (2 Sent. xvi.).

Obj. 3. Further, the image of God in man is threefold,—the image of nature, of grace and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (*ibid.*) that the *image is taken from the memory, the understanding, and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness*.

Obj. 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (*ibid.*) that the *image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue*.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83) : *Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely, 'image' and 'likeness,' since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.*

I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. v.*). Now, since *one* is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing as its preamble, and also as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between *likeness* and *image*. For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1) : and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an

image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways : first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense Augustine says (*Qq. 83*) that *the spirit* (namely, the mind) *without doubt was made to the image of God*. But *the other parts of man*, belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, *are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness*. In this sense he says (*De Quant. Animæ*) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility ; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*) that the image implies *an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man*. In the same sense likeness is said to belong to *the love of virtue* : for there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Likeness is not distinct from *image* in the general notion of *likeness* (for thus it is included in *image*) ; but so far as any *likeness* falls short of *image*, or, again, as it perfects the idea of *image*.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul's essence belongs to the *image*, as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature ; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Reply Obj. 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural *likeness* exists in the soul. Nor is it unfitting to use the term *image* from one point of view, and from another the term *likeness*.

Reply Obj. 4. Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of *image* ; but love of virtue belongs to *likeness*, as virtue itself belongs to *likeness*.

QUESTION XCIV.

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man ; first, as regards his soul ; and then as regards his body. Concerning the first, there are two things to be considered : (1) The condition of man as to his intellect ; (2) the condition of man as to his will.

Regarding the first of these there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God ? (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels ? (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge ? (4) Whether he could err or be deceived ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN SAW GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, *while established in Paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things*, as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*). And Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xiv.*) : *If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in Paradise, that place of ineffable happiness !* Therefore the first man in Paradise saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xiv.*) that the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain.

But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence *saw God immediately*, as the Master of the Sentences asserts (IV. i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.). But obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (I Cor. xv. 46) : *That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.* But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.

I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life ; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when *God cast a deep sleep upon Adam* (Gen. ii. 21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns misery. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. So all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished with the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the

more clearly is God seen in it ; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. But it is written, (*Eccles. vii. 30*), *God made man right*. Now man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xi.*) that, *perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels ; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence*. Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply Obj. 1. Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with a *life of happiness in a certain measure*, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. A good will is a well-ordered will ; but the will of the first man would have been ill ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply Obj. 3. A medium (of knowledge) is twofold ; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror : another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown ;

such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need ; for he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to his capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds : first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light ; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect : secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things ; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE SAW THE ANGELS THROUGH THEIR ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (*Dialog. iv.*) : *In Paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God ; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels.*

Obj. 2. Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which *is a load upon the soul*, as is written *Wisdom ix. 15*. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (Q. LXXXIX., A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul ; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself, as it is said in *De Causis*. But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam's soul.

I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence ; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same : and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body ; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a *living soul* ; that is, a soul giving life to the body,—namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already said (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7 ; Q. LXXXV., A. 1 ; Q. LXXXIX., A. 1) that since the soul is fitted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). The first is by the soul *passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself* ; the second is by the soul ascending *so as to be associated with the united superior powers*, namely the angels ; the third is when the soul is *led on yet further to the supreme good*, that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 3) : and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation

itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 2) ; the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge : for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that *he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits.*

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2. That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it ; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above, for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN KNEW ALL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first man did not know all things. For he had such knowledge either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species.

Not by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Neither through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (*De Anima* iii.) is *like a clean tablet on which nothing is written*. And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created.

Obj. 3. Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gen. ii. 20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things.

I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. So, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge,

and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.

Reply Obj. 1. The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature.

Reply Obj. 2. To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN IN HIS FIRST STATE COULD BE
DECEIVED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 14) that *the woman being seduced was in the transgression.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Master of the Sentences says (II., xxi.) that, *the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God.* But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.

Obj. 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be ; but the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii.) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities.

Obj. 5. Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as we have shown above. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii.) : *To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created ; but is a punishment of man condemned.*

I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things ; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief ;—or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge ex-

tended ; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed.

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life ; because, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), in that state of life *sin was avoided without struggle, and while the state lasted, no evil could exist.* Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi.). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein ; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. LXXXV., A. 6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true ; and hence it is never deceived of itself ; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. So we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi.) that, *the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conccit.*

Reply Obj. 2. The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point.

Reply Obj. 3. Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth.

Reply Obj. 4. A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action.

Reply Obj. 5. If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards the thoughts of hearts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.

QUESTION XCV.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL—
NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider what belongs to the will of the first man ; concerning which there are two points for treatment : (1) The grace and righteousness of the first man ; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.

Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the first man was created in grace ? (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul ? (3) Whether he had all virtues ? (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN WAS CREATED IN GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. xv. 45) : *The first Adam was made into a living soul ; the last Adam into a quickening spirit.* But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.*) that *Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost.* But whoever possesses grace, has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Correp. et Grat.*), *God so ordered the life of angels and men, as to show first*

what they could do by free-will, then what they can do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness. God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only ; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.

Obj. 4. Further, the Master of the Sentences says (II., xxiv.), *When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance.* But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.

Obj. 5. Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.

Obj. 6. Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xii.), *God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace.* Therefore man also was created in grace.

I answer that, In the opinion of some, man was not created in grace ; which was nevertheless bestowed on him subsequently before sin, for many authorities of the Saints confess that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. vii. 30, *God made man right.* For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul : and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and third ; for while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says (*cf. De Civ. Dei* xiii.). Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature ; other-

wise it would have remained after sin ; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declares (*Div. Nom.* iv.). So it is clear also that the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but was a supernatural endowment of grace ; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiii.) that, *as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience.* Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is *the firstborn of the dead*, as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul ; but that he had no spiritual life as regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost ; but *he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as He is possessed by the faithful*, who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

Reply Obj. 3. This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace ; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.

Reply Obj. 4. The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet his nature was so created that he could advance, not by merit, but by (the infusion of) additional grace.

Reply Obj. 5. As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.

Reply Obj. 6. We merit glory by an act of grace ; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature ; hence the comparison fails.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PASSIONS EXISTED IN THE SOUL OF THE FIRST MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul *the flesh lusteth against the spirit* (Gal. v. 7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence passions did not exist in the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) that *in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God, and other passions of the soul.*

I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are ordered to what is good ; as love and joy : others to what is evil ; as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object ; such as fear, sorrow, and the like ; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed *now*, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love ; or which regard future good to be

had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence ; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason ; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment ; at other times they follow after reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason : so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason ; which could not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2. The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q. XCVII., A. 2) ; likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them ; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as the Philosopher teaches (*Ethic.* iii.).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM HAD ALL THE VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb the passions ; as immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Obj. 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object ; as meekness with anger ; fortitude with fear ; which passions did not exist

in the state of innocence. Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Obj. 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with misery. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor misery existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

Obj. 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not ; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence ; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (*Serm. contra Judæos*), *The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, armed with modesty, ordered by temperance, resplendent with brightness*.

I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues ; this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I.-II., Q. LXIII., A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice ; such virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state ; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend

to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfecting of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act ; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed ; and mercy, which is sorrow for other's misery ; because sorrow, guilt, and misery are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not in their acts ; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for ; and had he seen misery in his neighbour, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, *Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a man who is careful of what he does, but only conditionally ; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong* (*Ethic.* iv.).

Reply Obj. 1. It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions. But it is essential to those virtues to moderate the passions.

Reply Obj. 2. Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion ; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state ; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others ; such as temperance, which relates not only to sadness, but also to joy ; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to

daring and to hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure ; and also fortitude, as moderating daring and hope ; but not as virtues moderating sadness and fear.

Reply Obj. 3 appears from the above.

Reply Obj. 4. Perseverance may be taken in two ways : in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good ; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue ; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue ; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.

Reply Obj. 5 appears from what is above explained.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF THE FIRST MAN WERE LESS MERITORIOUS THAN OURS ARE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succours most those who are most in want. Now we are more in want of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us ; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.

Obj. 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit ; for it is written (*2 Tim. ii. 5*) : No one *is crowned except he strive lawfully* ; and the Philosopher says (*Ethic. ii.*), *The objects of virtue are what is difficult and good.* But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.

Obj. 3. Further, the Master of the Sentences says (*II., xxiv.*) that *man would not have merited in resisting temptation ; whereas he does now.* Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state.

On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.

I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways : firstly, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God ; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said ; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good.

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if the degree of merit on the part of grace be considered ; which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature : and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the action ; because, as man could attain to greater virtue, he would perform greater actions. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness ; for a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Reply Obj. 1. After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin ; but not greater grace ; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Reply Obj. 2. Difficulty and struggle belong to the quantity of merit according to the proportionate degree of the action performed, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself : and the promptitude of the will is caused by the

intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed ; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace ; as in the same way there is no merit now to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state no impulse to evil existed, as in our present state. Hence man at that time could resist temptation more easily even without grace than it is possible for him at the present time.

QUESTION XCVI.

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence ; concerning which four points of inquiry arise : (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals ? (2) Whether he was master over all creatures ? (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal ? (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD MASTERSHIP OVER THE ANIMALS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ix.*), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.

Obj. 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome says (*cf. Bede, Hexam.*) : *God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he*

had no need of them : for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man. Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.

Obj. 4. Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26) : *Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth* (Vulg., and the whole earth.)

I answer that, As above stated (Q. XCV., A. 1) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways : Firstly, from the order observed by nature ; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (for the matter is for the sake of form, and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things ; for the imperfect are for the use of the perfect ; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (*Politic.* i.) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved from the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a property considered in man and in other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts ; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever

is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural.

Reply Obj. 1. A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man ; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Gen. i. 30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man : as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.

Reply Obj. 3. In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals ;—neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence,—nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise,—nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures.

Reply Obj. 4. All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason : which

accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN HAD MASTERSHIP OVER ALL OTHER CREATURES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*), *corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels*; much less therefore man in the state of innocence.

Obj. 2. Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants.

Obj. 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says in his letter to Polycarp. Therefore man had no dominion over them.

On the contrary, It is written (*Gen. i. 26*): *That he may have dominion over . . . every creature.*

I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so accordingly as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his *reason*, which makes him like to the angels; his *sensitive powers*, whereby he is like the animals; his *natural force*, which likens him to the plants; and the *body* itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no

mastership over the angels in the primitive state ; so when we read *all creatures*, we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscent, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN WERE EQUAL IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (*Moral. xxi.*) : *As long as we are without sin, we are equal.* But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal.

Obj. 2. Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Eccl. xiii. 19, *Every beast loveth its like ; so also every man him that is nearest to himself.* Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 3. Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others ; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. xiii. 1) : *The things which are of God, are well ordered* (Vulg., *Those that are, are ordained of God*). But order chiefly consists in inequality ;

for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.) : *Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place.* Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.

I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there was some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex : and likewise as regards age ; for some would have been born of others ; nor would sexual union have been sterile.

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself more, or less, to action, desire, or knowledge ; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help : since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some were born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and in all ways better disposed ; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Reply Obj. 1. By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice ; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.

Reply Obj. 2. Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals ; although there be not an equal response : for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother : although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.

Reply Obj. 3. The cause of inequality could be on the part of God ; not indeed in the sense that He would punish

some and reward others ; but that He would raise some above others ; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise in a natural manner as above described, without any kind of natural defect.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE BEEN MASTER OVER MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.) : *God did not wish man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, to be master except over the irrational creatures ; not man over man, but man over cattle.*

Obj. 2. Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty ; for after sin it was said to the woman, *Thou shalt be under thy husband's power* (*Gen. iii. 16*). Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.

Obj. 3. Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings which would not have been wanting in the state of innocence, *where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others ; and so one order is called that of *Dominations*. Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another.

I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning : First, as opposed to servitude, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is commonly referred to any kind of subject ; and in that sense even he who has the office of

governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the first meaning of mastership, man would not have been ruled by man in the state of innocence ; but in the latter sense man could be ruled over by man in that state. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the *Metaphysics* (of Aristotle), whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that a man rules over another as his slave when he refers the one whom he rules to his own—namely, the ruler's—use. And since every man's own proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject ; and in the state of innocence such a thing could not have existed between man and man.

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons : First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good ; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the *Politics*, that wherever many things are ordered to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts issued to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. iv. 10, *As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.* Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.) : *Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel. The natural order of things requires this ; and thus did God make man.*

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.

QUESTION XCVII.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man : firstly as regards the preservation of the individual ; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.

Concerning the first point there are four points of inquiry :
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal ?
(2) Whether he was impassible ? (3) Whether he stood in need of food ? (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMORTAL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term *mortal* belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. x.*). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.

Obj. 3. Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to

grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace ; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wisdom x. 2 : *He brought him out of his sins.* Hence he would have regained his immortality ; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4. Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apocalypse xxi. 4 : *Death shall be no more.* But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. v. 12) : *By sin death came into the world.* Therefore man was immortal before sin.

I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways : First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel, or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only ; like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption ; and this is called incorruptibility of glory ; because, as Augustine says, in a letter to *Dioscorus* : *God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, that is, the vigour of incorruption.* Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause ; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (*De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.*) : *God made man immortal as long as he did not sin ; so that he might be the cause of his own life or death.* For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigour of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason ;

for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (Q. LXXVI., A. 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2. These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3. This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory ; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin ; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as will be explained (P. III., Q. XIV., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WAS PASSIBLE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence man was passible. For *to feel is in a sense to be passive*. But in the state of innocence man was sensitive. Therefore he was passible.

Obj. 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion ; but man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gen. ii. 21, *God cast a deep sleep upon Adam*. Therefore he was passible.

Obj. 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say that *God took a rib out of Adam*. Therefore he was passible, to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.

Obj. 4. Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body ; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.

On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (*Topics vi.*) : *Excessive suffering wastes the very substance.*

I answer that, *Passion* may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action ; and in nature contraries act on, or suffer from, one another, accordingly as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, *passion* can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus to understand and to feel are said *in a sense to be passive*. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal ; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections ; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply Obj. 3. As already explained (Q. XCII., A. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. So as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue ; the same applies to the separation of the rib.

Reply Obj. 4. Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body ; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful ; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN HAD
NEED OF FOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to

restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food.

Obj. 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves possibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible ; it does not appear how food could be needful to him.

Obj. 3. Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise ; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Obj. 4. Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 16) : *Of every tree in Paradise ye shall eat.*

I answer that, In the state of innocence man's animal life required food ; but after the resurrection he will enjoy a spiritual life and will not need food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving life to the body ; whence it is written (Gen. ii. 7) : *Man was made into a living soul* ; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul ; and so the body was called *animal*, through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.) is the vegetative soul : the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit ; immortality to everyone ; impassibility, glory,

and power to the good, whose bodies will be called *spiritual*. So, after the resurrection, man will not require food ; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.*) : *How was man described as having an immortal body, which was sustained by food ? For an immortal being needs neither food nor drink.* For we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body : so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities ; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humour, man was obliged to take food.

Reply Obj. 2. A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible ; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature.

Reply Obj. 3. If man had not taken food he would have sinned ; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

Reply Obj. 4. Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so there would have been nothing superfluous ; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE ACQUIRED IMMORTALITY BY THE TREE OF LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its

own species ; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food ; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.

Obj. 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. So if the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality.

Obj. 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal ; which the Philosopher ridicules (*Metaph. iii.*).

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. iii. 22) : *Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.* Further, Augustine says (*De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.*) : *A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body ; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life.*

I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the loss of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument ; as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (*De Gener. i.*), arises from the fact that the humour which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humour already existing, lessens the specific active power ; as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth ; later on, however, the assimilated food

does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age it does not suffice even for this purpose ; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life ; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) : *Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst ; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age* ; and (*De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.*) : *The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.*

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality ; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble ; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite ; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect ; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once ; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality ; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given.

QUESTION XCVIII.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species ; and, firstly, of generation ; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Concerning the first, two points of inquiry arise : (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation ? (2) Whether generation would have been through coition ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE GENERATION EXISTED ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. v.*) : *Corruption is contrary to generation.* But contraries affect the same subject ; and there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation.

Obj. 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have

been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (*Etym.* v.). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 28) : *Increase and multiply, and fill the earth.* But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.

I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race ; otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual ; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but, as it were, subordinate to something else ; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void.

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species ; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual ; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature.

So it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication

of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1. In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual.

Reply Obj. 3. In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (*Politic.* ii.). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters—a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN GENERATION BY COITION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was *like an angel*. But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like to the angels, *they shall neither marry nor be married*, as it is written Matt. xxii. 30. Therefore neither in Paradise would there have been generation by coition.

Obj. 2. Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in Paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. iv. 1).

Obj. 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein ; whence continency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains himself from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Psalm xlviii. 13 : *Man, when he was in honour, did not understand ; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them.* Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman.

Obj. 4. Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gen. i. and ii.). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Gen. ii. 18, 20). But she was not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence.

I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (*De Hom. Opif.*) that in Paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels are multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (Q. XCVII., A. 3), just as it is

natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered—one, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman ; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female ; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of man and woman. The second thing to be observed is a certain abuse of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) : *We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members were equally moved by the will, without ardent incentive, with calmness of soul and body.*

Reply Obj. 1. In Paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like to an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ix.), our first parents did not come together in Paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from Paradise shortly after the creation of the woman ; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to the time.

Reply Obj. 3. Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind happened which was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (for rather sensible delectation was the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensi-

bility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence did not so inordinately throw itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By *immoderately* I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but the ardour of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes offspring, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) : In that state *intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity ; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses.* And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity ; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action.

QUESTION XCIX.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the condition of the offspring—firstly, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Concerning the first, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE HAD PERFECT STRENGTH OF BODY AS TO THE USE OF ITS MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER BIRTH?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (*De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i.*): *This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind.* But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants.

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength.

Obj. 3. Further, inability to secure a pleasure offered causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children were not deprived of the use of their limbs.

Obj. 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there was no weakness of old age. Therefore neither was there such weakness in infancy.

On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.

I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the sinews which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.

Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that *God made man right* (Eccles. vii. 30), which rightness, as Augustine says (*cf. Q. XCV., A. 1*), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends

to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act ; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy ; as is clear from his preceding remark that *even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.*

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed ; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them.

Reply Obj. 3. is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except what was befitting to their state of life.

Reply Obj. 4. In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth ; but not senile defects of corruption.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER, IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE, WOMEN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* iii.) that woman is a *misbegotten male*, as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born.

Obj. 2. Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born.

Obj. 3. Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born.

On the contrary, nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen. i. and ii.). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born.

I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.

Reply Obj. 1. Woman is said to be a *misbegotten male*, as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q. XCII., A. 1 ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2. The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection supposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (*De Animal. Histor. vi.*): *The northern wind favours the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females*: sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Espe-

cially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

Reply Obj. 3. The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number.

QUESTION C.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Concerning this we have two points of inquiry : (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness ? (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN IN A STATE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (*De Sacram.* i.) : *Before sin, the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness.*

Obj. 2. Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (*Rom.* v. 16, 21). But grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Obj. 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents to the children.

On the contrary, Anselm says (*De Concep. Virg.* x.) : *As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul.*

I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Hugh are to be understood, not as referring to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. XCV., A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (*ibid.*). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN CONFIRMED IN RIGHTEOUSNESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (*Moral.* iv.) on the words of Job iii. 13 : *For now I should have been asleep, etc. : If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer.* Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says (*Cur Deus Homo* i.) : *If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more.* Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness.

Obj. 4. Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like to himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) : *Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they—that is, our first parents—had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned.* From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil ; and

therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God ; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the Essence of Good, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law ; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body ; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. So it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1. If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten *children of hell* in the sense of contracting from him the sin which is the cause of hell. But by sinning of their own free-will they could have become *children of hell*. If, however, they did not become *children of hell* by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows : *It seems that if they had lived, etc.*

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case

only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 4. There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angels' is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. LXIV., A. 2).

QUESTION CI.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE now consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge, concerning which there arise two points of inquiry : (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN WITH PERFECT KNOWLEDGE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like to himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. XCIV., A. 3). Therefore the children born of him would have had perfect knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (*cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXV., A. 3*). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge from birth.

Obj. 3. Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.

On the contrary, The human soul is naturally *like a blank*

tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.

I answer that, As above stated (Q. XCIX., A. 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 7); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired by the sensitive powers. We must conclude, then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.

Reply Obj. 1. The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he did not beget children like to himself in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 2. Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth; for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.).

Reply Obj. 3. Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHILDREN WOULD HAVE HAD PERFECT USE OF REASON AT BIRTH ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, *The corruptible body is a load upon the soul* (Wisd. ix. 15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flies from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.

On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

I answer that, As above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tied and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular

state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. XCIX., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.

Reply Obj. 2. Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly ; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. XCIX., A. 1).

QUESTION CII.

OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Concerning this there arise four points of inquiry : (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place ? (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation ? (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise ? (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PARADISE IS A CORPOREAL PLACE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede (Strabus, Gloss on Gen. ii. 8) says that *paradise reaches to the lunar circle*. But no earthly place answers to that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen. ii. 10). But the rivers so mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (*Meteor.* i.). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 3. Further, although men have explored the entire inhabited world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 4. Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is

written of Wisdom that She is a tree of life *to them that lay hold on her* (Prov. iii. 18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place.

Obj. 5. Further, if paradise is a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not ; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*) : *Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal ; others a place entirely spiritual ; while others, whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xiii.*) : *Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise ; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred.* For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history ; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (*Etymol. xiv.*), is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden. It was fitting that it should be in the east ; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand of the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (*De Cœl. ii.*) ; and the right hand is nobler than the left ; so it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply Obj. 1. Bede's (Strabus's) assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively ; because, as Isidore says (*loc. cit.*), the atmosphere there is of a continually even temperature ; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the

heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth ; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise ; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighbourhood of the earth.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*) : *It is probable, as man has no idea where paradise was, that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?*

Reply Obj. 3. The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed ; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.

Reply Obj. 4. The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power, as above stated (*Q. XCVII., A. 4.*). Yet it had a spiritual signification ; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events ; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will, as some say.

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. v., viii.*), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues ; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise ; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six

days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads : *The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning* (Gen. ii. 8).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PARADISE WAS A PLACE ADAPTED TO BE THE ABODE OF MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also.

Obj. 2. Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul ; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.

Obj. 3. Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore, if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose.

Obj. 4. Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature ; for it is said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*) : *Paradise was a divinely ordered region. and worthy of him who was made to God's image.*

I answer that, as above stated (Q. XCVII., A. 1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humours, and by old age, as above explained (Q. XCVII., A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature ; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found ; because, as Damascene says (*loc. cit.*) : *Paradise was permeated with the all-pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants.* Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality.

Reply Obj. 1. The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode of the angels ; for, as Augustine says (*De Trin. ii.*), *God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures.* So it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it was a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. So the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel ; therefore he was there created. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation : it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2. It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in

regard to spiritual substances. So the earthly paradise was a fitting place for man, for both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (*loc. cit.*) : *No irrational animal inhabited paradise*; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.

Reply Obj. 3. Paradise did not become useless by being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Reply Obj. 4. Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN WAS PLACED IN PARADISE TO DRESS IT AND KEEP IT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the

state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. iii. 17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of a trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise.

Obj. 3. Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise ; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 15) : *The Lord God took man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*), these words of Genesis may be understood in two ways. Firstly, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine) ; and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labour, as it did after sin ; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser ; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good ; so paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely.

Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN WAS CREATED IN PARADISE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place—namely,

the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise.

Obj. 2. Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (Q. XCVII., A. 4). Therefore he was created in paradise.

Obj. 3. Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 15) : *God took man and placed him in paradise.*

I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was not man's by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life ; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.

Reply Obj. 1. The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.

TREATISE
ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT

QUESTION CIII.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

HAVING considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general ; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. As to the first, there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether the world is governed by someone ? (2) What is the end of this government ? (3) Whether the world is governed by one ? (4) Of the effects of this government ? (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government ? (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God ? (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything ? (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ANYONE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end ; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Obj. 2. Further, those things are governed which are moved towards some object. But the world does not

appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Obj. 3. Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

On the contrary, It is written (*Wisd. xiv. 3*) : *But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence*. And Boëthius says (*De Consol. iii.*) : *Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal*.

I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. Firstly, by observation of things themselves : for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best ; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end ; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed ; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (*De Nat. Deorum*), quoting Aristotle (Cleanthes). Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 4; Q. LXV., A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as *it belongs to the best to produce the best*, it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end : and this is to govern.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. Firstly, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures ; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly,

a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply Obj. 2. In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q. CIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression of God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression of the archer, and not of the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as what creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD IS
SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is reduced. But that whereto a thing is reduced is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is reduced to health which is something good in him. Therefore

the end of the government of all things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic. i.*) : *Some ends are an operation ; some are the work*—i.e., produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself ; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.

Obj. 3. Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the *tranquillity of order*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xvi. 4) : *The Lord hath made all things for Himself.* But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.

I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q. XLIV., A. 1), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end ; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good ; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good ; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness ; while a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

Reply Obj. 1. We may acquire some good in many ways : first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge ;

secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house ; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as he who buys a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts ; for the end of some of the arts consists in some work, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp ; but the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired, or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented ; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto ; as far as is possible.

Reply Obj. 3. A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof ; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end ; as the order in an army is ordered to the general, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. xii.*).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. But we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 2. Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or

unskilfulness of the ruler ; which cannot apply to God. But created things do not agree together ; and act against each other ; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 3. Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it is better that two should be together than one (Eccles. iv. 9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (I Cor. viii. 6) : *To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord :* and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects ; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. XIII., A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.

I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good ; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end ; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boëthius proves (*De Consol.* iii.) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity ; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can ; and the dissolution of a thing arises from some defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is what the Philosopher asserts (*Metaph.* xii.) :

Things refuse to be ill governed ; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one prince.

Reply Obj. 1. Movement is the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover. Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q. XLVII., A.A. 1, 2 ; Q. XLVIII., A. 2), and not by a diversity of governors.

Reply Obj. 2. Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

Reply Obj. 3. If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition of good is possible.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT IS ONE OR MANY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is but one effect of the government of the world, and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order ; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

Obj. 2. Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

Obj. 3. Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. xii.*) : *God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness.* But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged

from its end ; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways : firstly, on the part of the end itself ; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things ; firstly, with regard to this, that God is good ; and so the creation becomes like Him by being good : and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others ; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world ; and in this way they are without number.

Reply Obj. 1. The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another ; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. ix. 11) : *I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the*

learned, nor favour to the skilful, but time and chance in all. But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9) : *God hath no care for oxen.* But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 3. Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself ; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself ; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei v.*) : *Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature.* Therefore all things are subject to His government.

I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection ; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (Q. XLIV., A. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness ; as we have shown (A. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 4 ; Q. LXV., A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that

the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, *God hath abandoned the earth* (*Ezech. ix. 9*).

Reply Obj. 1. These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance; not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but *time and chance*, that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

Reply Obj. 2. Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down *Phys. iii.* And every act is proportioned to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. So, when the Apostle says that *God hath no care for oxen*, he does not wholly withdraw

them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

Reply Obj. 3. The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE IMMEDIATELY GOVERNED BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.*) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts ; the first, that of the supreme God, who watches over heavenly things and all universals ; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption ; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

Obj. 2. Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. viii.*). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

Obj. 3. Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others ; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*) : *As the*

lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself.

I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The explanation is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design, or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.

Reply Obj. 1. Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.

Reply Obj. 2. If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

Reply Obj. 3. That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity ; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.) that *God disposes all for good*. Therefore if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

Obj. 3. Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable ; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent ; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, It is written (*Esth.* xiii. 9) : *O Lord, Lord almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will.*

I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause ; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause ; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause ; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause,

and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government ; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. XLVIII., A. 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 2. Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, *nothing in the world happens by chance*, as Augustine declares (Qq. lxxxiii.).

Reply Obj. 3. Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects ; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN RESIST THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. iii. 8) : *Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.*

Obj. 2. Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Obj. 3. Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.) : *There is nothing that can resist or desire to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly*, as is said (*Wisd.* viii.) of Divine wisdom.

I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways ; in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all ; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways : firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only ; *for no one acts intending evil*, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) : secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1 ad 3 ; A. 5 ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover ; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said to *order all things sweetly*.

Reply Obj. 1. Some are said to think or speak, or act against God ; not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government ; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good : but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 3. From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause ; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

QUESTION CIV.

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular ; concerning which four points of inquiry arise : (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God ? (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God ? (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness ? (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CREATURES NEED TO BE KEPT IN BEING BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being ; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it ; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q. L., A. 2, 5) : and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures

whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. LXVI., A. 2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be ; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

Obj. 2. Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being ; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build ; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt ; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw his action.

Obj. 4. Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so ; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is : nor does it add anything new to the creature ; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature ; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. i. 3) : *Upholding all things by the word of His power.*

I answer that. Both reason and faith bind us to say that

creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and through something else (*per accidens*) ; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another directly and in itself, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xvi.).

This is made clear as follows : Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the *becoming* of its effect, but not directly of its *being*. This may be seen both in artificial and in natural things : for the builder causes the house in its *becoming*, but he is not the direct cause of its *being*. For it is clear that the *being* of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire ; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the *being* of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its *becoming* depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of *being* which results from that form ; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its *becoming* only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other ; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other words, it may be the case that *this matter* receives *this form*. And this is to be the cause of *becoming*, as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the *becoming* of the effect, but not its *being*, depends on the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent : as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves : thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of *becoming* but also the cause of *being*.

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the *becoming* of the effect : so neither can the *being* of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in *becoming* but also in *being*. This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action ; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptible of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always ; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. There-

fore, since it has no root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being by virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*): *If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.* In the same book he says: *As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.*

Reply Obj. 1. *Being* naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of *being* but only of *becoming*.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4. The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD PRESERVES EVERY CREATURE IMMEDIATELY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1 ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself ; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Obj. 3. Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its *becoming*, but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their *becoming*, for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. XLV., A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways ; firstly, indirectly and through something else, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause ; secondly, directly, and of itself by the fact that on it depends the other's being, as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents ; and for that reason are called preservatives ; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction ; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that,

while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect, which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way ; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes : thus the Philosopher says (*Metaph. xii.*), that the first, namely the diurnal, movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated ; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply Obj. 1. God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply Obj. 2. Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends ; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.

Reply Obj. 3. No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change ; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition ; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN ANNIHILATE ANYTHING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (*Qq. 83*) that *God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence*. But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

Obj. 2. Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ. i.*) : *Because God is good, we exist.* But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist ; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.

Obj. 3. Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be ; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated ; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

On the contrary, It is written (*Jer. x. 24*) : *Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment ; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.*

I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (*Q. XIX., A. 4*), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to *Ps. cxxxiv. 6* : *Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.* Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will ; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and so not to make them ; so,

after they have been made, He is free not to continue their existence ; and thus they would cease to exist ; and this would be to annihilate them.

Reply Obj. 1. Non-existence has no direct cause ; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.

Reply Obj. 2. God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures ; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.

Reply Obj. 3. If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part ; but a mere cessation of His action.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING IS ANNIHILATED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (*Phys. viii.*) that, *a finite power cannot move in infinite time*. Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration ; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 3. Further, forms and accidents have no matter as

part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (*Eccles. iii. 14*) : *I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever.*

I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things ; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (*Q. CV., A. 6*). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature ; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, *To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit* (*i Cor. xii. 7*) ; and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence ; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace ; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

Reply Obj. 1. That things were brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them ; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle ; *Upholding all things by the word of His power* (*Heb. i. 3*).

Reply Obj. 2. A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive ; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they

may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something *of a being*; for it is called a being, because something exists by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

QUESTION CV.

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now consider the second effect of the Divine government, *i.e.*, the change of creatures ; and first, the change of creatures by God ; secondly, the change of one creature by another.

The first gives rise to eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form ? (2) Whether He can immediately move a body ? (3) Whether He can move the intellect ? (4) Whether He can move the will ? (5) Whether God works in every worker ? (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things ? (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous ? (8) Of the diversity of miracles.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE MATTER IMMEDIATELY TO THE FORM ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* vii.), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter ; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

Obj. 2. Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause ; for, as the Philosopher says (*De*

Anima iii.), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.

Obj. 3. As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes ; as we have seen above (Q. CIV., A. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7) : *God formed man of the slime of the earth.*

I answer that, God can move matter immediately to a form ; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power : and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form ; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.

Reply Obj. 1. An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. Firstly, according to the same species ; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause ; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause : thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form, as we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 2) ; wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion ; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself ; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this ; because the power of no other separate

substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter ; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God ; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE A BODY IMMEDIATELY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. vii.*), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and the moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body ; for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. i.*) : *There is no contact with God.* Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 2. Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (*Phys. viii.*) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant ; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as

we have explained above (Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately, among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen. i. 9 : *Let the waters be gathered together into one place*. Therefore God can move a body immediately.

I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A. 1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover ; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form ; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply Obj. 1. There are two kinds of contact ; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other ; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched ; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them ; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, *There is no contact with God* ; that is, so that God Himself be touched.

Reply Obj. 2. God moves as the object of desire and apprehension ; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved ;

but as being desired and known by Himself ; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher (*Phys.* viii.) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of *bulk*, by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power of *bulk*, would move without time, which is impossible ; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of *bulk* moves in its entirety ; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time ; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in *bulk* is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them ; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD MOVES THE CREATED INTELLECT
IMMEDIATELY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject ; since it does not pass into external matter ; as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* ix.). But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is ; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another ; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding ; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.

Obj. 3. Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps. xciii.) that God *teaches man knowledge*. Therefore God moves the human intellect.

I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being ; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality ; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding ; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being ; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything

exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand ; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded ; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause ; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding ; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q. XII., A. 2 ; Q. LVI., A. 3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q. XII., A. 4).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE CREATED WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without ; and therefore cannot be moved by God.

Obj. 2. Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will ; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.

Obj. 3. Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved ; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. ii. 13) : *It is God who worketh in us* (Vulgate—you) both to will and to accomplish.

I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good ; for its object is the universal good ; just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good ; God alone is the universal good. Wherefore He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is the universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate ; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will ; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination ; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced ; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2. To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3. If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WORKS IN EVERY AGENT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2. Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3. Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvi. 12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in (Vulgate—for) us.*

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any

effect in things, but that God alone is the immediate cause of everything wrought ; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things : and this would imply lack of power in the Creator : for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things, to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them ; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect : and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act ; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes ; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent ; the second is the agent ; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form) ; as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed ; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent ; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God ; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that

where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first: for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colours, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colours are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job x. 11: *Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.*

Reply Obj. 1. God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2. One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3. God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

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SIXTH ARTICLE.

~~WHETHER GOD CAN DO ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED ORDER OF NATURE?~~

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (*Contra Faust. xxvi.*) says : *God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.* But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

Obj. 2. Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice ; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3. Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore if God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable ; which cannot be said.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust. xxvi.*) : *God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature.*

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle ; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order ; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household ; which order is contained in the order of the city ; which order again depends on the ruler of the city ; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order ; for, if He did so, He would act against His fore-

knowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order ; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes ; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will ; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi.) : *God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law ; because He does not act against Himself.*

Reply Obj. 1. In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination ; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards ; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends ; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature ; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction ; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God ; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (*ibid.*) : *That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature.*

Reply Obj. 2. The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice ; and therefore God can do nothing against such order.

Reply Obj. 3. God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to

Himself whatever He intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE NATURAL ORDER IS MIRACULOUS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order ; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle.

Obj. 2. Further, a miracle is something difficult, and which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous ; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently ; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts v. 15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature ; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things that are outside the course of nature are miraculous.

Obj. 3. Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses ; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.

*On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi.) : Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle.*

I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden ; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his *Metaphysics*. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others : as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder ; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all : and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply Obj. 1. Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause ; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.

Reply Obj. 2. An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature : likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope of *nature*, not above the hope of *grace*, which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MIRACLE IS GREATER THAN ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (*Epist. ad Volusian.*) : *In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer.* But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

Obj. 2. Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion ; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John xiv. 12) : *The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do.*

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power ; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. xl. 15 : *Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance.* But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater is the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways : firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards ; or if a human body is glorified : such things nature is absolutely unable to do ; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done ; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like ; for nature can give life, but not to the dead ; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done ; as when a man is cured of a

fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature ; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias ; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed. *From this it is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.*

QUESTION CVI.

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold : (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures ; (2) How bodies move ; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered : (1) How an angel acts on an angel ; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature ; (3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels ; and of their mutual co-ordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment ? (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another ? (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel ? (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL ENLIGHTENS ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to the text : *They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother*

(Jer. xxxi. 34). Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Obj. 2. Further, light in the angels is threefold ; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature, by the Creator ; in the light of grace, by the Justifier ; in the light of glory by the Beatifier ; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

Obj. 3. Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is *informed by God alone, without created intervention*, as Augustine says (*Qq. 83*). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. viii.*) that *the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy*.

I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. v. 13 : *All that is made manifest is light.* Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth ; according to the Apostle (Eph. iii. 8) : *To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God.* Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself.// Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. vii.*) : *Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds.*

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (*Q. CV., A. 3*), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood ; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power ; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighbourhood of a more perfect body,—for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter ; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by

the superior angel turning to him : since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighbourhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel ; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.) : *Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy.*

Reply Obj. 1. All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks ; wherefore he adds : *They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying : Know the Lord : for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest.* But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself ; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter ; and as to this Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), that the angels *are enlightened by the types of existing things.*

Reply Obj. 2. An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory ; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone ; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form : for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth ; while other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL MOVES ANOTHER ANGEL'S WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will : for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to the will ; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

Obj. 2. Further, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) : *The names of the angels designate their properties.* Now the Seraphim are so called because they *kindle* or *give heat* : and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.

On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness : for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. CV., A. 4), the will is changed in two ways ; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will,

as the appetible moves the appetite ; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (*ibid.*), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked : *Show me Thy glory*, answered : *I will show thee all good* (Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will : just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.

Reply Obj. 1. Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (A. 1) ; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect ; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. vi.*) : that *in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening on things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge*. For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness ; enlightened by the diffusion of

light ; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the coloured object.

Reply Obj. 2. One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite, which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INFERIOR ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN A SUPERIOR ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy ; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called *our mother* (Gal. iv. 26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (I Cor. xiv. 31) : *You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted.* Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Obj. 2. Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (Q. CV., A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore he also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferiors otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Obj. 3. Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately ; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, this is the Divine unalterable law that inferior things are led to God by the superior (Cœl. Hier. iv.).

I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained (Q. CV., A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is under cause ; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God ; since the angelic operations are not made known to us ; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God ; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 1. The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God ; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge ; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science ; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another ; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply Obj. 2. As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUPERIOR ANGEL ENLIGHTENS THE INFERIOR
AS REGARDS ALL HE HIMSELF KNOWS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xii.), that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge ; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.

Obj. 2. Further, the Master of the Sentences says (II. 11) that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance : *Who is this King of glory?* other angels, who knew, answered : *The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory,* as Dionysius expounds (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

Obj. 3. Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior ; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.

On the contrary, Gregory (Master of the Sentences, II. 9, cf. Gregor., *Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*) says : *In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet, nothing is held individually.* And Dionysius says : *Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior* (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.), as quoted above (A. 1).

I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine

goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others ; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness ; saying : *As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another ; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God* (I Pet. iv. 10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels ; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge ; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply Obj. 1. The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2. The Master's words are not to be so understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation ; but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels ; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply Obj. 3. Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.

QUESTION CVII.

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE now consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry : (1) Whether one angel speaks to another ? (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior ? (3) Whether an angel speaks to God ? (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance ? (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL SPEAKS TO ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (*Moral. xviii.*) that, in the state of the resurrection *each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows.* Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Obj. 2. Further, speech is twofold ; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself ; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Obj. 3. Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen ; for this happens among us by some

sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

On the contrary, The Apostle says : *If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels* (1 Cor. xiii. 1).

I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) : *It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.*

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (Q. LXXXII., A. 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways ; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.) ; secondly, as actually considered or conceived ; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, *which anyone uses when he wills*. So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will ; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself ; for the concept of the mind is called *the interior word*. And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another ; and in this way one angel speaks to another ; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.

Reply Obj. 1. Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to the text : *What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?* (1 Cor. ii. 11). The other obstacle

whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body ; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once made known to another ; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (*Moral.* ii.) : *To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body ; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are.* But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.

Reply Obj. 2. External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel ; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word ; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INFERIOR ANGEL SPEAKS TO THE SUPERIOR ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. xiii. 1), *If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels*, the gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby

the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (Q. CVI., A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.

Obj. 2. Further, as was said above (Q. CVI., A. 1), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. ii.*): *God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things.* But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.

On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius, the inferior angels said to the superior: *Who is this King of Glory?*

I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: *Heaven was created by God;* or, *Man is an animal.* The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to

another : *I wish to learn this ; I wish to do this or that.* The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth ; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand, does not belong to the perfection of my intellect ; but only to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God ; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme ; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening ; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL SPEAKS TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.

Obj. 2. Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God ; which in some

ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.

On the contrary, It is written (*Zach. i. 12*) : *The angel of the Lord answered and said ; O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.* Therefore an angel speaks to God.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1, 2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner ; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will ; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master ; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend ; thus Gregory says (*Moral. ii.*) that *the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.*

Reply Obj. 1. Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another ; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself ; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works ; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LOCAL DISTANCE INFLUENCES THE ANGELIC
SPEECH ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. i.*): *An angel works where he is.* But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place.

Obj. 2. Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that *they cried one to another* (*Isa. vi. 3*). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.

On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (*Luke xvi. 24*). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.

I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the *here and now*. For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the *here and now*, except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from *here and now*, neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.

Reply Obj. 1. The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1 ad 2), is interior ; perceived, nevertheless, by another ; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another ; and this is to perceive his speech.

Reply Obj. 2. The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice

raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) : *The less one desires, the less one cries out.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS KNOW WHAT ONE SPEAKS TO ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.

Obj. 2. Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Obj. 3. Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.) : *Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others.* Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.

I answer that, As above explained (A. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels ; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel ; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

QUESTION CVIII.

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders ; for it was said above (Q. CVI., A. 3), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels ; and not conversely.

Concerning this subject, there are eight points of inquiry :
(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy ?
(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order ?
(3) Whether in one order there are many angels ?
(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural ? (5) Of the names and properties of each order.
(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.
(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment ?
(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE OF ONE HIERARCHY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (*Metaph.* xii., *Polit.* iii.). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.) that

hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action. But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 3. Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

On the contrary, Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

I answer that, Hierarchy means a *sacred* principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things : the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures ; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things ; according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xii.) : *There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked.* But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, thus principality is said to be *one* accordingly as the multitude can be subject in *one* way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities : thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels ; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* i.). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (Q. LV., A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things,

concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as proceeding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, *as it were, placed in the vestibule of God*, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied ; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes ; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the *supercelestial* hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.) : *The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected ; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect* ; which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection considers on the part of the prince, forasmuch as the multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

Reply Obj. 2. As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His Essence—there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels ; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding ; which is not the case in the angels : and hence the same argument does not apply to both.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORDERS IN ONE
HIERARCHY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many.

Obj. 2. Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for *nothing is possessed individually* (*2 Sent. ix.*). Therefore there are not different orders of angels.

Obj. 3. Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished as according to the actions of *cleansing*, *enlightening*, and *perfecting*. For the order of deacons is *cleansing*, the order of priests is *enlightening*, and of bishops *perfecting*, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* v.). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*Eph. i. 20, 21*) that *God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion* : which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).

I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions ; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labour in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all

may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles ; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class (*populus honorabilis*). In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base ; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.).

Reply Obj. 1. Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades ; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order ; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

Reply Obj. 2. All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however being held more excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it ; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect than what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies ; as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions.

Reply Obj. 3. The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, *He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he*—namely, John the Baptist, than whom *there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women* (Matt. xi. 11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE MANY ANGELS IN ONE ORDER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (Q. L., A. 4), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.

Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel ; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

Obj. 3. Further, it was said above (*Obj. 1*) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order ; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order.

On the contrary, It is written : *The Seraphim cried to one another* (Isa. vi. 3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.

I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another ; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 1. All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order ; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* x.) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.

Reply Obj. 2. That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 3. As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality ; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DISTINCTION OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS COMES FROM THE ANGELIC NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is a *sacred principality*, and Dionysius places in its definition that it *approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be* (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the Seraphim are called *burning* or *kindling*, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for *it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us* (Rom. v. 5): *which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xii.). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.

Obj. 3. Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

On the contrary, The Master of the Sentences (II. 9) says that *an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts.* Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. LXII., A. 6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts:

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ORDERS OF THE ANGELS ARE PROPERLY NAMED ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, *Know ye that the Lord He is God* (Ps. xcix. 3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called *dominations* (*i.e.*, lords).

Obj. 3. Further, the name *domination* seems to imply government, and likewise the names *principalities* and *powers*. Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to these three orders.

Obj. 4. Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other orders than to *principalities*.

Obj. 5. Further, the name *seraphim* is derived from ardour, which pertains to charity; and the name *cherubim* from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Obj. 6. Further, *thrones* are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature is He said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of *thrones* besides the *cherubim* and *seraphim*. Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name *seraphim* is found in Isaias vi. 2; the name *cherubim* in Ezechiel i. (*cf.* x. 15, 20); *thrones* in Colossians i. 16; *dominations*, *virtues*, *powers*, and *principalities* are mentioned in Ephesians i. 21; the

name *archangels* in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name *angels* is found in many places of Scripture.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in co-ordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner : by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature : by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q. XIII., A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to God : by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially ; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto ; as, for instance, when we wish to properly name a man, we should call him a *rational substance*, but not an *intellectual substance*, which latter is the proper name of an angel ; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to a man by participation ; nor do we call him a *sensible substance*, which is the proper name of a brute ; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation ; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess ; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations ; for he says that *angels are so called as announcing the least things ; and the archangels in the greatest ; by the virtues miracles are wrought ; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed ; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves.*

Reply Obj. 1. Angel means messenger. So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called angels. But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation ; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only ; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* v.). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of angels, forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

Virtue can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also *heavenly essences*. Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength ; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the name '*virtues*' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength ; first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them ; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them ; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 2. As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xii.) : *Domination is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess : but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts.* Hence Dionysius also states

(*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the name *domination* means first *a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression*, endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies *a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants*. Thirdly, it signifies *the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God*. Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God ; as the name *virtues* signifies the participation of the Divine virtue ; and the same principle applies to the rest.

Reply Obj. 3. The names *domination*, *power*, and *principality* belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (*Hom. xxiv. in Evang.*), that *some companies of the angels, because others are subject in obedience to them, are called dominations*. The name *power* points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, *He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God* (*Rom. xiii. 2*). And so Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the name *power* signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of *powers* it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside (*principari*) as Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) is *to be first among others*, as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.) that the name of *principalities* signifies *one who leads in a sacred order*. For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called *princes*, according to the words, *Princes went before joined with singers* (*Ps. lxvii. 26*).

Reply Obj. 4. The *archangels*, according to Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.), are between the *principalities* and the *angels*. A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes ; thus tepid

seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the *archangels* are called the *angel princes*; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the *angels*, and angels as regards the *principalities*. But according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*) they are called *archangels* because they preside over the one order of the *angels*; as it were, announcing greater things: and the *principalities* are so called as presiding over all the heavenly *virtues* who fulfil the Divine commands.

Reply Obj. 5. The name *seraphim* does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardour or fire. Hence Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) expounds the name *seraphim* according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is *heat*, which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervour; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervour, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly, we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name *cherubim* comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted *fulness of knowledge*, which Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.

Reply Obj. 6. The order of the *thrones* excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas the *cherubim* have the excellence of knowledge and the *seraphim* the excellence of ardour.

And although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the *thrones* does not include the other two ; and so the order of the *thrones* is distinguished from the orders of the *cherubim* and the *seraphim*. For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (*ibid.*) explains the name *thrones* by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site ; because seats are raised above the earth, and so the angels who are called *thrones* are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case : for the angels themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon ; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter ; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GRADES OF THE ORDERS ARE PROPERLY ASSIGNED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of *dominations*, *principalities*, and *powers* of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought to be supreme.

Obj. 2. Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of *thrones* is the nearest to God ; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the *thrones* is the highest.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of *cherubim* seems to be higher than the *seraphim*.

Obj. 4. Further, Gregory (*Hom. xxiv. in Evang.*) places the *principalities* above the *powers*. These therefore are not placed immediately above the archangels, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. ix.*).

On the contrary, Dionysius (*ibid. vii.*), places in the highest hierarchy the *seraphim* as the first, the *cherubim* as the middle, the *thrones* as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the *dominations*, as the first, the *virtues* in the middle, the *powers* last; in the lowest hierarchy the *principalities* first, then the *archangels*, and lastly the *angels*.

I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (*loc. cit.*) and Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier. vii.*), who agree as regards all except the *principalities* and *virtues*. For Dionysius places the *virtues* beneath the *dominations*, and above the *powers*; the *principalities* beneath the *powers* and above the *archangels*. Gregory, however, places the *principalities* between the *dominations* and the *powers*; and the *virtues* between the *powers* and the *archangels*. Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (*Eph. i. 20, 21*) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest, saying that *God set Him, i.e. Christ, on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion*. Here he places *virtues* between *powers* and *dominations*, according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (*i. 16*), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: *Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him*. Here he places the *principalities* between *dominations* and *powers*, as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and the third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal

disposition of what is to be done ; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work ; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the *seraphim, cherubim, and thrones* ; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition ;—the *dominations, virtues, and powers* ; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the *principalities, angels and archangels*.

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end ; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end ; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end ; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. xii.*) ; so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader ; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets ; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy ; for the *thrones* are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself ; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The *cherubim* know the Divine secrets supereminently ; and the *seraphim* excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself ; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the *thrones* ; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called *angels*.

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which

are to be done, and this belongs to the *dominations*; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the *virtues*; the third is to order how, what has been commanded or decided to be done, can be carried out by others, which belongs to the *powers*.

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the *principalities*. There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the *angels*. Others hold a middle place; and these are the *archangels*, as above explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the *thrones*, who in their own order are akin to the *dominations*; for the *thrones*, according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*), are so called because through them God accomplishes His judgments, since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations.—The order of the *powers* is akin to the order of the *principalities*; for as it belongs to the *powers* to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of *principalities*, who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man (*Ethic. i.*); and hence it is written, *The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me* (*Dan. x. 13*).

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the *dominations* appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations,

the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), *bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit.* So the first order after the *dominations* is called that of *principalities*, who rule even over good spirits; then the *powers*, who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. xiii. 3, 4). After these come the *virtues*, who have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the *angels* and the *archangels*, who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The angels' subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God.

Reply Obj. 2. The nearness to God designated by the name of the *thrones*, belongs also to the *cherubim* and *seraphim*, and in a more excellent way, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. As above explained (Q. XXVII., A. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

Reply Obj. 4. A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name *principalities* from their *presiding over good spirits*, which also agrees with the *virtues* accordingly as this name expresses a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of

the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the *virtues* seem to be the same as the *principalities* of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations ; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the archangels and the angels.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ORDERS WILL OUTLAST THE DAY OF JUDGMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 24), that Christ will bring to naught all *principality and power*, when *He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father* ; and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all other orders will be abolished in that state.

Obj. 2. Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. i. 14), that *they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation* ; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Judg. v. 20), *Stars remaining in their order and courses*, which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders.

I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things ; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4) ; and these differences will ever re-

main in the angels ; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end ; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

Reply Obj. 1. The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end ; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, *When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father, i.e., when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.*

Reply Obj. 2. The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect ; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge ; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.

Reply Obj. 3. Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE TAKEN UP INTO THE ANGELIC ORDERS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 2. Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like ; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 3. Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons ; for Chrysostom rejects this (*Hom. xxviii. in Matt.*). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.

On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, *they will be as the angels of God* (*Matt. xxii. 30*).

I answer that, As above explained (AA. 4, 7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders ; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels ; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the

resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Luke xx. 36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order ; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades ; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect ; and that the others will constitute their own order, as it were corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xii.), that *there will not be two societies of men and of angels, but only one ; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone.*

Reply Obj. 1. Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (A. 4 ; Q. LXII., A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace ; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God ; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves : and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, *nor do they interfere in the things of the living*, as Augustine says (*De cura pro mortuis*). Still by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices ; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (*ibid.*).

Reply Obj. 3. It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons ; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead ; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

QUESTION CIX.

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider the ordering of the bad angels ; concerning which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether there are orders among the demons ? (2) Whether among them there is precedence ? (3) Whether one enlightens another ? (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE ORDERS AMONG THE DEMONS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (*De Nat. Boni*) ; and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality ; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.

Obj. 3. Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders ; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called *seraphim*, or *thrones*, or *dominations*. Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. vi. 12) : Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.

I answer that, As explained above (Q. CVIII., AA. 4, 7, 8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at that time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q. LXII., A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.).

Reply Obj. 1. Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (Q. XLIX., A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.

Reply Obj. 2. If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The name *seraphim* is given from the ardour of charity; and the name *thrones* from the Divine indwelling; and the name *dominations* imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AMONG THE DEMONS THERE IS PRECEDENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some

order of justice. But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, *Among the proud there are always contentions* (Prov. xiii. 10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

Obj. 3. If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature, but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

On the contrary, On 1 Cor. xv. 24 the gloss says: *While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons.*

I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence;—that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Wisd. viii. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

Reply Obj. 2. The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness, whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 3. The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to wretchedness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more wretched.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

Obj. 2. Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 1). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: *What can be made clean by the unclean?* (Ecclus. xxxiv. 4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (Q. CVII., A. 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of

the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order ; and so one demon does not enlighten another ; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.

Reply Obj. 2. According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above expounded (Q. LV., A. 2 ; Q. LVIII., A. 2 ; Q. LXXIX., A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GOOD ANGELS HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER THE BAD ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.

Obj. 2. Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels ; which cannot be admitted.

Obj. 3. Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii.), that the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life ; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv.) that the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers.

I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God ; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels ; of which perfection the demons are deprived ; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

Reply Obj. 1. Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil, or for the trial of the good ; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God ; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God ; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 2. The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows ; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior ; because the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, *the spiritual man judgeth all things* (1 Cor. ii. 15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii.) that *the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.*

QUESTION CX.

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures : concerning which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels ? (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels ? (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally ? (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE IS GOVERNED BY THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the corporeal creature is not governed by the angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power ; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic

offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things ; which is against what is laid down above (Q. CVIII., A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) that *all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life*; and Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.), that *in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature*.

I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power ; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q. LV., A. 3 ; Q. CVIII., A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the inferior, possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance ; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the *here and now* ; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior ; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

Reply Obj. 1. Corporeal things have determinate actions ; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved ; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (*Metaph.* xi.) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances ; the number of which he endeavoured to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls ; and this was because he did not consider that any opera-

tions were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the *active intelligence*.

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (*Qq. 83*), *Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it*; and Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*), *The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order*; and Origen says on the text, *When the ass saw the angel* (*Num. xxii. 23*), that *the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things* (*Hom. xiv. in Num.*). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature

to preside over animals than over plants ; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal thing : the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (Q. CVIII., A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the *powers* ; so to the order of the *virtues* do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures ; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CORPOREAL MATTER OBEYS THE MERE WILL OF AN ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul ; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter ; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument ;

and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul : but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw ; but that it assumes at length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels ; for it obeys God alone.*

I answer that, The Platonists (*cf. Phaedo* xlix.) asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter, proceed from the concept of the *intellect* ; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made directly as it were (*quasi per se factum*), so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph. vii.*), what is made, properly speaking, is the *composite* : for this, properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is not called a being, as that which is, but as that by which something is ; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made ; for that is made which is ; since to be made is nothing but the way to existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite ; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole *composite* as to both matter and form is within its power ; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or from some corporeal agent ; but not immediately from an angel.

Reply Obj. 1. Our soul is united to the body as the form ; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept ; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies ; and hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way ; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

Reply Obj. 3. There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself) ; since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent ; for it is natural for like to make like.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER BODIES OBEY THE ANGELS AS REGARDS LOCAL MOTION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (*Phys.* viii.) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of

the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.

Obj. 3. Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.) : *Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second.* Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii.). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances ; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

Reply Obj. 1. There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms ; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon ; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements ; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is

limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body ; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS CAN WORK MIRACLES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*) : *Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done.*

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Qq. 83*) that *magicians work miracles by private contract ; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice.* But magicians work miracles because they are *heard by the demons*, as he says elsewhere in the same work (*cf. lib. xxi., Sent.*). Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*lib. xxi., Sent.*) that *it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere.* But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

Obj. 4. Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents ; which is to work miracles.

On the contrary, It is written of God (*Ps. cxxxv. 4*) : *Who alone doth great wonders.*

I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature ; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a

miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature ; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.

Reply Obj. 1. Some angels are said to work miracles ; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles ; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place ; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

Reply Obj. 2. Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called *miracles* not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons ; and these are said to be done by *private contract*, forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by *public justice* : but bad Christians by *the signs of public justice*, as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.

Reply Obj. 3. Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.

QUESTION CXI.

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire : (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power. (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men. (3) How they guard and protect men. On the first point there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect ? (2) Whether he can change man's will ? (3) Whether he can change man's imagination ? (2) Whether he can change man's senses ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN MAN ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith ; hence Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier. iii.*) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as *the sacrament of faith*. But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. ii. 8 : *By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.* Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel ; but immediately by God.

Obj. 2. Further, on the words, *God hath manifested it to them* (*Rom i. 19*), the gloss observes that *not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work*, that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately...

Obj. 3. Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment, as we have stated (Q. CVI., A. 1; Q. CVII., A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.

I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q. CIX., A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. CVI., A. 1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (*ibid.*).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* i.), that, *It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.* On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.

Reply Obj. 1. Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed

to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will ; hence Augustine says, *No one believes except willingly.* In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer ; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. x. 17, *Faith cometh by hearing* ; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed ; but also as regards what is to be done.

Reply Obj. 2. Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood ; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle ; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS CAN CHANGE THE WILL OF MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, *Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire* (Heb. i. 7), the gloss notes that they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning

away our vices. This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.

Obj. 2. Further, Bede says (*Super Matth. xv. 11*), that, *the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them.* Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that *every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men* (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

Obj. 3. Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.

On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. xxi. 1: *The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it.*

I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way,—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. CVI., A. 2).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing

in the sensitive appetite ; as by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

Reply Obj. 1. Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.

Reply Obj. 2. The demon cannot put thoughts (in our minds) by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will ; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling *a putting in*, because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God; though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3. The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms ; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN CHANGE MAN'S IMAGINATION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection. 1. It seems that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said *De Anima* iii., is a motion caused by the sense in act. But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible

matter (Q. CX., A. 2). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*) : *By the intermingling of another spirit it is possible that he can show, by these images, what he himself knows to the one he is with, so that either the latter understands it himself, or unfolds it to others.* But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

Obj. 4. Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination.

On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Matt. i. 20 ; ii. 13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q. CX., A. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humours. Hence Aristotle says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*), when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that *when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it*, that is, the impressions left from the movements of sensible things, which movements are preserved in the animal spirits, and move the sensitive principle ; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humours may be so great

that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humours, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.

Reply Obj. 1. The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly ; as a man born blind cannot imagine colour. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine colour), but by local movement of the spirits and humours, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated ; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

Reply Obj. 4. An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify ; and then there is no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination ; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect of him to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN CHANGE THE HUMAN SENSES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. CX., A. 4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses ; but these are changed always by the sensible object.

On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, struck the people of Sodom with blindness, so that they could not find the door (Gen. xix. 11). The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings vi. 18).

I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner ; from without, as when affected by the sensible object : and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humours are disturbed ; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric humour, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. LI., A. 2). Likewise he can move the spirits and humours from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

Reply Obj. 1. The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive

power ; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. By the interior movement of the spirits and humours an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures ; but he can, outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order ; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.

QUESTION CXII.

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider the mission of the angels ; from which arise four points of inquiry : (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry ? (2) Whether all are sent ? (3) Whether those who are sent, assist ? (4) From what orders they are sent.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE SENT ON WORKS OF MINISTRY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the *here* and *now*. Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.

Obj. 2. Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost ; which is unseemly.

Obj. 3. Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom ; hence it is said : *He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom* (Ecclus. xxxviii. 25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened ; which is unfitting.

Obj. 4. Further, to minister is the part of an inferior ; hence it is written : *Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth ? is not he that sitteth at table ?* (Luke xxii. 27). But the angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxiii. 20) : *Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee.*

I answer that, As appears from what is above explained (Q. CVIII., A. 6), some angels are manifestly sent in ministry by God. For, as above stated (Q. XLIII., A. 1), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to exist where he was not, or in another way, where he already was. For the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin ; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of His Godhead ; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. VIII., A. 1). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another ; and so he is *here* in such a manner as not to be *there*. Now it is manifest by what is above stated (Q. CX., A. 1), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. So, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power ; and in that way begins to be present afresh. All this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God. But the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle by Whose wish and authority the angels work ; and is also reduced to God as to its last end ; and the angel does this as a minister, for a minister is an intelligent instrument. Moreover an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another, and so the angel's actions are called *ministries* ; and they are thus sent in ministry.

Reply Obj. 1. An operation can be intellectual in two ways ; in one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation ; which operation does not demand to occupy a place ; indeed, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) : *Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world.* In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect ; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place.

Reply Obj. 2. The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity ; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven ; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

Reply Obj. 3. In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation ; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by the intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation ; because of two actions, one of which is the rule and reason of another, one does not hinder but helps the other. So Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.*

Reply Obj. 4. In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us ; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every creature. So the Apostle says : *Esteeming others better than themselves* (*Phil.* ii. 3).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE SENT IN MINISTRY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb. i. 14): *All are ministering spirits, sent to minister.*

Obj. 2. Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (Q. CVIII., A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Isa. vi. 6, 7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.

Obj. 3. Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent.

Obj. 4. Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. L., A. 4), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry ; which contradicts the words, *Thousands of thousands ministered to Him* (Dan. vii. 10).

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*), quoting the opinion of Dionysius, that *the higher ranks have no exterior service.*

I answer that, As appears from Q. CX., A. 1, the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. By the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by

the condensation of the clouds into rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior ; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. This, however, does not seem to be a reasonable opinion ; because the angelic order is according to the gifts of grace. Now the order of grace has no order above itself for the sake of which it should be passed over ; as the order of nature is passed over for the sake of grace. It may likewise be observed that the order of nature in the working of miracles is passed over for the confirmation of faith ; which purpose would receive no additional strength if the angelic order were passed over, as we could not perceive it by sense. Further, there is nothing in the Divine ministries above the capacity of the inferior orders. Hence it is that Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that *those who announce the highest things are called archangels. So the archangel Gabriel was sent to the Virgin Mary* : yet, as he says further on, this was the greatest of all the Divine ministries. Thus with Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier. xiii.*) we must say, without any distinction, that *the superior angels are never sent to the external ministry.*

Reply Obj. 1. As in the missions of the Divine Persons, there is a visible mission, in regard to the corporeal creature, and an invisible mission, in regard to a spiritual effect ; so likewise in the angelic missions, there is an external mission, in respect of some administration of corporeal things—and on such a mission not all the angels are sent : and there is an interior mission, in respect of some intellectual effect, just as one angel enlightens another—and in this way all the angels are sent.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law ; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no

need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.

Reply Obj. 2. According to Dionysius (*ibid.*), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a *seraph*, that is, *kindling* in an equivocal sense, because he came to *kindle* the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.

Reply Obj. 3. The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as shown above (*loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 4. A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS WHO ARE SENT, ASSIST ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*): *So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited; yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited.*

Obj. 2. Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, *I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord* (*Tob. xii. 15*). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

Obj. 3. Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to *Job i. 6*: *When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also*

was present among them. Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

Obj. 4. Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they do not immediately receive the Divine enlightenment, but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is supreme. Therefore only the supreme angel assists; which is contrary to the text, *Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him* (Dan. vii. 10). Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xvii.), on Job xxv. 3 : *Is there any numbering of His soldiers? Those powers assist,* says he, *who do not go forth as messengers to men.* Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.

I answer that, The angels are spoken of as *assisting* and *administering*, after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father.* Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

Reply Obj. 3. Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants ; for, as Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) : *Though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels.*

Reply Obj. 4. All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence ; so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God ; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior ; some of whom enlighten others : as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS OF THE SECOND HIERARCHY ARE SENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Daniel vii. 10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist ; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xvii.) that *there are more who minister than who assist.* This would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the *dominations are above all subjection.* But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

I answer that, As above stated, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature ; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry.

Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) ; and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name *dominations* does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the *angels* and *archangels* are so called from *announcing* ; the *virtues* and *powers* are so called in respect of some act ; for it is right that the *prince*, according to what Gregory says (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*), *be first among the workers*. Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry ; not to the four superior orders.

Reply Obj. 1. The dominations are reckoned as among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others ; so an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.

Reply Obj. 2. A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist ; as he takes the words *thousands of thousands ministered to Him*, not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean *thousands out of thousands* ; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess ; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, *and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him*. This idea rests on that of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number ; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. By this opinion the number of orders is preserved, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however (*Cœl. Hier.* xiv.) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things ; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multi-

tude ; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. So, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words *thousands of thousands* are taken by way of multiplication, to signify *a thousand times a thousand*. And because *ten times a hundred* is a thousand, to say *ten times a hundred thousand* would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers. But as it is written *Ten thousand times a hundred thousand*, we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify the precise number of angels but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

QUESTION CXIII.

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels ; and their warfare against the bad angels. Concerning the first, eight points of inquiry arise : (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels ? (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel ? (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels ? (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian ? (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin ? (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men ? (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded ? (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE GUARDED BY THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man can guard himself by his free-will and by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. cxx. 4: *He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel.* Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.

Obj. 3. Further, the loss of one guarded redounds to the negligence of the keeper; hence it was said to a certain one: *Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life* (3 Kings xx. 39). Now many men perish daily, falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.

On the contrary, It is written: *He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways* (Ps. xc. 11).

I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.

Reply Obj. 1. By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written: *The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain* (Wisd. ix. 14). Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Reply Obj. 2. Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of moral virtue. Secondly, that reason

should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue ; this the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi.) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues ; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q. CXI., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EACH MAN IS GUARDED BY AN ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

Obj. 2. Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv., xiii.). But as all the angels are unequal (Q. L., A. 4), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men.

Obj. 3. Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another ; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* x.), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.

On the contrary, On the text, *Their angels in heaven*, etc.

(Matt. viii. 10), Jerome says : *Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed in guardianship from its birth.*

I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever ; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*), the different orders are deputed to the different *genera* of things, for instance the *powers* to coerce the demons, the *virtues* to work miracles in things corporeal ; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. So it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

Reply Obj. 1. A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons : first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due ; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community ; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.

Reply Obj. 2. As above stated (Q. CXII., A. 3 ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but, as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.

Reply Obj. 3. Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Eccl. xxxiii. 11, 12: *With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low.* Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO GUARD MEN BELONGS ONLY TO THE LOWEST ORDER OF ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Matt. xviii. 10), *Their angels in heaven, etc.*, is to be understood not of any angels, but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says: *The angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation* (Heb. i. 14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry (Q. CXII., A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

Obj. 3. Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs

most of all to the powers, according to Gregory (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*) ; and to work miracles which belongs to the virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.

On the contrary, In Psalm xc. the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels ; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius.

I answer that, As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways ; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him ; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the *lesser things* ; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of *principalities*, or perhaps to the *archangels*, whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled *one of the princes* (Dan. x. 13). Moreover all corporeal natures are guarded by the *virtues* ; and likewise the demons by the *powers*, and the good spirits by the *principalities*, according to Gregory's opinion (*loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels ; for, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. x.*) in each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God to the higher degree of glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Not all angels sent have guardianship of individual men ; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' power ; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS ARE APPOINTED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ALL MEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. ii. 7) that He was *made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.* If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 2. Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence : for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 3. Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Infidels also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention : for *faith directs the intention* as Augustine says (*Enarr. ii. in Ps. xxxi.*). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be according to the working of Satan, as it is written (2 Thess. ii. 9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

On the contrary is the authority of Jerome quoted above, for he says that *each soul has an angel appointed to guard it.*

I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should tend towards the (heavenly) fatherland. In this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to Ps. clxi. 4 : *In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me.* And therefore as guardians are appointed for

men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a traveller. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel ; but in the kingdom he will have an angel as a companion in reigning, in hell a demon to punish him.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God : wherefore He needed not to be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He was a *comprehensor*, although in regard to His possible body, he was a *traveller*. In this latter respect it was right that He should have, not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt. iv. 11) that *angels came and ministered to Him*.

Reply Obj. 2. In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within : because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above (Q. XCV., AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons ; as was proved by the event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason ; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race,—namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL IS APPOINTED TO GUARD A MAN FROM HIS BIRTH ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are sent to minister for

them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, as the Apostle says (Heb. i. 14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

Obj. 2. Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.

Obj. 3. Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*vide A. 4*) that *each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from the moment of birth*.

I answer that, As Origen observes (*Tract. v. Super Matt.*) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (*loc. cit.*), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.

Reply Obj. 1. Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn from others although they are not so efficacious as to bring

them to salvation : efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

Reply Obj. 2. Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood ; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

Reply Obj. 3. As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her : just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it ; as Jerome, above quoted, says.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGEL GUARDIAN EVER FORSAKES A MAN ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. li. 9) in the person of the angels : *We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed : let us forsake her.* And (Isa. v. 5) it is written : *I will take away the hedge*—that is, *the guardianship of the angels* (gloss)—*and it shall be wasted.*

Obj. 2. Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. xxi. 2 : *O God, my God, look upon me : why hast Thou forsaken me?* Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orth. ii.*), *When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven.* But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. v. 8 : *Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion,*

goeth about, seeking whom he may devour. Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.

I answer that, As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God : for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship : for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man ; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS GRIEVE FOR THE ILLS OF THOSE WHOM
THEY GUARD ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. xxxiii. 7) : *The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.* But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), *sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.* But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

Obj. 3. Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Luke xv. 7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.

Obj. 4. Further, on Numbers xviii. 12 : *Whatsoever first-fruits they offer*, etc., the gloss of Origen says : *The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault.* But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.

On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness : wherefore it is written (Apoc. xxi. 4) : *Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow.* But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (*loc. cit.*) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice ; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii.) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances ; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary : thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as the Philosopher states in the same passage. Therefore

universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.

Reply Obj. 1. These words may be understood of the angels, *i.e.*, the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Isa. xxxvii.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the *angels of peace* are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the analogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.

Reply Obj. 4. The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE STRIFE OR DISCORD AMONG THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job xxv. 2): *Who maketh peace in His high places.* But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.

Obj. 2. Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the

right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good (angel) is a compounder of wrong ; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. x. 13) : *The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days.* But this prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others ; and thus there is strife among them.

I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin ; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

But according to Gregory (*Moral.* xvii.), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them : and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore for as much as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another : not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree ; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

QUESTION CXIV.

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS.

(In Five Articles.)

WE now consider the assaults of the demons. Concerning this we have five points of inquiry : (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons ? (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil ? (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons ? (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray ? (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE ASSAILED BY THE DEMONS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God : for the demons' intention is the loss of souls ; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.

Obj. 2. Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.

Obj. 3. Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be exercised.

Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. vi. 12) : *Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood ; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places.*

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavour to hinder man's progress ; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Reply Obj. 1. The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin ; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God ; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings (xxii. 20). For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other from that for which they are sent ; for they punish from hatred or envy ; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2. In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings vi. 16), Eliseus said to his servant : *Fear not, for there are more with us than with them.*

Reply Obj. 3. The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness : but it

does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO TEMPT IS PROPER TO THE DEVIL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Genesis xxii. 1, *God tempted Abraham*. Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.

Obj. 2. Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Obj. 3. Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Q. CXI., A. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. iii. 5): *Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you*: to which the gloss adds, *that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt.*

I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something: and for

this reason it is a sin to tempt God ; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt : for though at times man tempts thus, he does this as a minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (*Deut. xiii. 3*) : *The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love Him.*

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations ; inasmuch as one can know what sort of a man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity : of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. The demons know what happens outwardly among men ; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the *weigher of spirits* (*Prov. xvi. 2*). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another : hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.

Reply Obj. 3. Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (*Q. CXI., A. 3*), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree : by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL SINS ARE DUE TO THE TEMPTATION OF THE DEVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that *the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to*

themselves and to others. And Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii.) that *all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil.*

Obj. 2. Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (John viii. 44) : *You are of your father the devil.* But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

Obj. 3. Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels : because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.

On the contrary, It is written (*De Eccl. Dogmat.*) : *Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will.*

I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways ; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect : for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins ; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race : and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin : for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (*Peri Archon* iii.), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and suchlike pleasures ; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires be curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in

order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates *through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents*, as Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* iii.).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Man can of his own accord fall into sin : but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works : whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEMONS CAN LEAD MEN ASTRAY BY MEANS OF REAL MIRACLES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Anti-christ. But as the Apostle says (*2 Thess. ii. 9*), his coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform only lying wonders.

Obj. 2. Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body ; for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xvii.*) ; *I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power.* Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

Obj. 3. Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by

demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of faith. This is unfitting ; for it is written (Mark xvi. 20) : *The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.*

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83) : *Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Q. CX., A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone : since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvellous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And *when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep ; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phantoms* ; as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xx.*).

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, *either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do ; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.*

Reply Obj. 2. As we have said above (Q. CX., A. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels

at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another ; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformations of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds ; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons ; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within ; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise than it is, as explained above (Q. CXI., AA. 3, 4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without : for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly : so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xviii.) : *Man's imagination, whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal.* This is not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man : but that the demon who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (Qq. 83) : When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory : the latter, for the glory of God : the former, by certain private compacts : the latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A DEMON WHO IS OVERCOME BY MAN, IS FOR THIS REASON HINDERED FROM MAKING FURTHER ASSAULTS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

Obj. 2. Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.

On the contrary, It is written (Matt. iv. 11) : *Then the devil left Him, i.e., Christ who overcame.*

I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time : wherefore (Luke iv. 13) it is written : *All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time.* There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency ; for as Chrysostom says (*Super Matt. Hom. v.*), *the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows ; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness.* The other reason is taken from the astute-

ness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke iv. 13 : *The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat.* That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Matthew xii. 44 : *I will return into my house from whence I came out.*

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.

QUESTION CXV.

OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature ; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry : (1) Whether a body can be active ? (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues ? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies ? (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts ? (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence ? (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A BODY CAN BE ACTIVE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei v.*) : *There are things that are acted upon, but do not act ; such are bodies : there is one Who acts but is not acted upon ; this is God : there are things that both act and are acted upon ; these are the spiritual substances.*

Obj. 2. Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work, a subject susceptible of its action. But there is no substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action ; since it belongs to the lowest degree in beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

Obj. 3. Further, every corporeal substance is limited by

quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it : just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.

Obj. 4. Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

Obj. 5. Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form ; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident ; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for *an accident does not extend beyond its subject*, as Augustine says (*De Trin. ix.*). Therefore no bodies are active.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. xv.*) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, *it shows its greatness in its action and power on that which it lays hold of*.

I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicenna in his book on *The Fount of Life*, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavours to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions, which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies : so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter, are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto ; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal ; wherefore he said that these separate forms

are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicenna held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter : and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto ; thus in proportion to the participation of light, is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such ; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal : but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicenna goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate ; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are *the great* and *the small*, which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to be *the rare* and *the dense*. Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follow him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form ; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies ; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Q. XLV., A. 8).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (*De Gener.* i.). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and that the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action ; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1. This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act ; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicenna argues thus, *There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive*, that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act ; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Reply Obj. 3. Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above ; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. Firstly, because addition of quantity does not cause weight ; as is proved (*De Cœlo et Mundo* iv.). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement ; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held ; but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply Obj. 4. A body is not that which is most distant from God ; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter ; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

Reply Obj. 5. The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument : wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form ; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident, to surpass its subject in acting, but it is, to surpass it in being ; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient ; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE ANY SEMINAL VIRTUES IN CORPOREAL MATTER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue (*ratio*) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Trin.* iii.) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter ; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act

(A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4. Further, there are said to be certain *causal virtues* (Augustine, *De Gen. ad lit.* v.) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.): *Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world.*

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word *nature* has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, *nature*, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v.), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called *nativity*: and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word *nature* has been applied to every principle of movement, existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of *seminal virtues* (*seminales rationes*) to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* vi.), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as *typal ideas*. Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in *universal causes*. Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are pro-

duced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in *particular causes*. Fourthly, they are in the *seeds* produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1. These active and passive virtues of natural things, though not called *virtues (rationes)* by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas (*rationes ideales*).

Reply Obj. 2. These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3. The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word *seed* covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (*De Trin. iii.*) that, *as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn beings*. Nevertheless the *typal ideas* can be called *causal virtues*, but not, strictly speaking, *seminal virtues*, because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF WHAT IS PRODUCED IN BODIES HERE BELOW ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii.) : *We say that they—namely—the heavenly bodies, are not the cause of generation or corruption : they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes.*

Obj. 2. Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter ; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v.) : *Nothing is more corporeal than sex.* But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies : a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) : *Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature.* And Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) says that *the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection.*

I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity ; and since what is immovable is always in the same

way of being, whereas what is moved, has many ways of being : it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below ; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.

Reply Obj. 2. The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the *rare* and the *dense* ; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being : and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies : which is clearly false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (*De*

Gener. ii.), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body : thus the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii.) that *man and the sun generate man*.

Reply Obj. 3. The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.

Reply Obj. 4. The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex ; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars : because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN ACTIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Obj. 2. Further, everything multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to

the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.

Obj. 3. Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii.) that *the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions.*

I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally : because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs ; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense ; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs : for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers : wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of neces-

sity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite ; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscent have a certain force in inclining the will ; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that *such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on* (*Odyssey xviii. 135*). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1. The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies ; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q. CXI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause : so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will, is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3. The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements heavenly bodies can cooperate : but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases ; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that *the wise man is stronger than the stars*, forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HEAVENLY BODIES CAN ACT ON THE DEMONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matthew iv. 24 and xvii. 14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

Obj. 2. Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.

Obj. 3. Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, *herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures*, as Porphyrius says, quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei x.*). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, The demons are superior, in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the *agent is superior to the patient*, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii.*). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (*De Civ. Dei x.*) relates as having been held by Porphyrius, namely, that *on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars*. But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man

in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge ; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are *animals with an aerial body and a passive soul*, as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* viii.). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above : according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (A. 5). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (Q. LI., A. 1) : for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies, neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1. That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to *defame God's creature*, namely, the moon ; as Jerome (*In Matt.* iv. 24) and Chrysostom (*Hom. lvii. in Matt.*) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Q. CXIV., A. 4 ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that *the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body*, as Aristotle says (*De Partu Animal.* ii.) : wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that the animal forces culminate : wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

Reply Obj. 2. Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi.) : *The demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs ;* that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honour due to God, of which they are covetous.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HEAVENLY BODIES IMPOSE NECESSITY ON THINGS SUBJECT TO THEIR ACTION ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings ; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle : since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*) : *It is not incongruous that many of the signs, observed*

in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled. Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

I answer that, This question has been partly solved above (A. 4) ; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity ; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients, who supposing that everything that is, has a cause ; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity ; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (*Metaph.* vi.) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such causes do fail in the minority of cases, is due to some hindering cause ; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that by itself (*per se*) is a being, has a cause ; but what is not by itself a being, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For that a thing is *white*, has a cause, that a man is *musical* has a cause, but that a being is *white-and-musical* has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered

to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes, is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

Reply Obj. 1. The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause, can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.

QUESTION CXVI.

ON FATE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE come now to the consideration of fate ; and there are four points of inquiry : (1) Is there such a thing as fate ? (2) Where is it ? (3) Is it unchangeable ? (4) Are all things subject to fate ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE BE SUCH A THING AS FATE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (*Hom. x. in Evang.*) : *Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.*

Obj. 2. Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei v.*) : *Fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak* ; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are 'fore-spoken' by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.

On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boëthius (*De Consol. iv.*) defines fate thus : *Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order.*

I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that some-

thing is lucky or chance-like, as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place ; the meeting of the two servants, in regard to themselves is by chance ; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (*De Civ. Dei* v.). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Q. XXII., A. 2).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than *a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born* (Augustine, *loc. cit.*). But this will not hold. Firstly, as to human affairs : because we have proved above (Q. CXV., A. 4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally : for it has been said (*ibid.* A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental, to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle : wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by

accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a pre-ordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect : otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition : *The digger of a grave found a treasure.* And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it ; for instance, someone who knows of a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. CV., A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were *fore-spoken*, we can admit the existence of fate : although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v.) : *If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.* For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate : wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes : but not if compared to Divine providence, whereby *nothing happens at random in the world*, as Augustine says (Qq. 83).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FATE IS IN CREATED THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v.) that the *Divine will or power is called fate.* But the Divine will or power is not in

creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2. Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause ; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident : and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Consol. iv.*) : *Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3 ; Q. CIII., A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself : and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boëthius says (*De Consol. iv.*) : *Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits ; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged.* Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1 ; Q. CIV., A. 2 ; Q. CX., A. 1 ; Q. CXIII., Q. CXIV.). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1. The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (*De Civ. Dei. v.*) calls the 'series of causes,' has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or series, i.e. order, of second causes.

Reply Obj. 2. Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3. Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one ; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote : *Thy fate draws thee.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FATE IS UNCHANGEABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.) : *As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre ; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Topic.* ii.) : *If we be moved, what is in us is moved.* But fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, as Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*). Therefore fate is changeable.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

On the contrary, Boëthius says that fate is an unchangeable disposition.

I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways : firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered ; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or disposition of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity ; for this reason

that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q. CXV., A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (*Nemesius, De Homine*). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary : *If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.* Wherefore Boëthius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds,—*which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence, must also itself be unchangeable.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO FATE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boëthius says (*De Consol. iv.*) : *The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.* Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ Dei v.*) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*) that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things. But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (De Consol. iv.) that some things subject to Providence, are above the ordering of fate.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate ; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*) : viz., that *those things which are nigh to God, have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate.* Hence it is clear that *the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more is it involved in the chain of fate* ; since so much the more is it bound up with second causes.

Reply Obj. 1. All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes ; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.

Reply Obj. 3. Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

QUESTION CXVII.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature (*see introduction to Q. CVI.*). In the first place we shall consider that action (in general), and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge ? (2) Whether man can teach an angel ? (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter ? (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MAN CAN TEACH ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt. xxiii. 8) : *Be not you called Rabbi (i.e. Master)* : on which the gloss of Jerome says, *Lest you give to men the honour due to God.* Therefore to be a master is properly an honour due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.

Obj. 2. Further, if one man teaches another, this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.

Obj. 3. Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.

Obj. 4. Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom : for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 7) : *Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the gentiles in faith and truth.*

I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroës, commenting on *De Anima* iii., maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). From this it followed that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself ; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known : for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (*loc. cit.*).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who

held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q. LXXIX., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (*De Anima* iii.).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* viii.). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. Firstly, that art in its work imitates nature, for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, does not act as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an inferior

principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research ; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses ; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him ; according to what the Philosopher says (*Poster. i.*) : *All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.*

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science : for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge : or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner ; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q. CVI., A. 1 ; Q. CXI., A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order ; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (*Poster. i.*) that *a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge.* In this way a demonstrator causes his hearers to know.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above, the teacher only brings

exterior help, as the physician who heals : but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written : *Who healeth all thy diseases* (Ps. cii. 3) ; so of Him is it written : *He that teacheth man knowledge* (Ps. xciii. 10), inasmuch as *the light of His countenance is signed upon us* (Ps. iv. 7), through which light all things are shown to us.

Reply Obj. 2. As Averroës argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality : but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.

Reply Obj. 3. The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly : but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.

Reply Obj. 4. The signs proposed by the master to the disciple, are of things known in a general and confused manner ; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have been his own master : because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN CAN TEACH THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that men can teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 10) : *That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church.* But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.

Obj. 2. Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened

immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 1; Q. CXII., A. 3). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God ; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. i. 1, 2 : *Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.* Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels ; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that every Divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels. Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CVII., A. 2), the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them ; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words (*Matt. xi. 11*) : *There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist ; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.* Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts : because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. v.*) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says : *To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God.—Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places—*

that is, through the Church. As though he were to say : This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it *from all ages, but not before all ages :* because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together.

It can also be explained otherwise that *what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here when it takes place and is made public,* as Augustine says in the same place. Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (*Comment. in Ep. ad Eph., loc. cit.*),—that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learnt certain mysteries ; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves : thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2. The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3. Certain men even in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually ; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN BY THE POWER OF HIS SOUL CAN CHANGE CORPOREAL MATTER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (*Dialog. ii.*) :

Saints work miracles, sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira. But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

Obj. 2. Further, on these words (Gal. iii. 1) : *Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?* the gloss says that *some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children.* But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*) : *Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., A. 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in Whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (*ibid.*) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1. The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear, for Gregory says in the same place: *Those who have the power to be the sons of God, as John says,—what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?*

Reply Obj. 2. Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment

to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the 'evil eye.'

But it has been shown above (Q. CX., A. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance : in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a *menstruata*, as Aristotle says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*).

So then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is united to the body as its form ; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 3), is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATE HUMAN SOUL CAN MOVE BODIES AT LEAST LOCALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.

Obj. 2. Further, in the *Itinerary* of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i.) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life : so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body ; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

Reply Obj. 1. There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies ; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body ; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of

lower degree : thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x.) and Chrysostom (*Hom. xxviii. in Matt.*) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.

QUESTION CXVIII.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE now consider the production of man from man : firstly, as to the soul ; secondly, as to the body.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry : (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen ? (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted ? (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE SOUL IS TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEmen ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation : for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body ; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.

Obj. 2. Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power ; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the

sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.

Obj. 3. Further, the generator begets its like : so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body ; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

Obj. 4. Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal ; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made : or it would be distinct therefrom ; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements,—for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Genesis i. 20 : *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life.* Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.

I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q. LXV., A. 4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And

since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false,—namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. LXXV., A. 3) : for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them; but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has : for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves ; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium—in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh : with a medium—in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

Reply 1. The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (Q. XXV., A. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.

Reply Obj. 2. The generating power begets not only by its own virtue, but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

Reply Obj. 3. This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (Q. CXV., A. 3 ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that *man and the sun generate man*. Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (*De Anima* ii.).

Reply Obj. 4. In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* ii.); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter the vegetable soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the

active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent ; and the movement of an instrument ceases, when once the effect has been produced.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL IS PRODUCED FROM THE SEMEN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gen. xlvi. 26) : *All the souls that came out of his (Jacob's) thigh, sixty-six.* But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 2. Further, as shown above (Q. LXXVI., A. 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals ; wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal. ii.*) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 3. Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form : else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.

Obj. 4. Further, man begets his like in species. But the

human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.

Obj. 5. Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

On the contrary, It is written in *De Eccl. Dogmat.* that *the rational soul is not engendered by coition.*

I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter, according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach to the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal. ii.*) : *It follows that the intellect alone comes from without.*

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. LXXV., A. 2) : therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent, and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.

Reply Obj. 1. In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of

the mother ; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false ; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo ; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes ; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 3).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul ; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without.—But this will not hold. Firstly, because no substantial form is susceptive of more or less ; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetable soul is from the beginning in the matter of the offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection ; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent : and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent ; and

we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body :—or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul : and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common : but this has been disproved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2).

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted : yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form ; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter : thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (Q. CV., A. 5 ; Q. CX., A. 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.

Reply Obj. 4. Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power, the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain (species of) form.

Reply Obj. 5. In the action of the adulterer, what is of

nature is good ; in 'this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil ; in this God does not concur.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMAN SOULS WERE CREATED TOGETHER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. ii. 2) : *God rested Him from all His work which He had done.* This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.

Obj. 2. Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe : consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Genesis ii. 2, where it is said that *God ended (all) His work.*

Obj. 3. Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.

On the contrary, it is said (*De Eccl. Dogmat.*) that *the soul is created together with the body.*

I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident ; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. LXXV., A. 4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above

(Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXV., A. 1) : for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 6, 7; Q. LXXXV., A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part : whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without the body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it,—this seems incongruous. Firstly, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body : for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since *nature does not fail in what is necessary*. Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance : since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur.—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter.—If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies,

but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (John v. 17) : *My Father worketh until now*; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.

Reply Obj. 3. That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning : for as it is written (Wisd. i. 13, 16) : *God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.*

QUESTION CXIX.

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry : (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature ? (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SOME PART OF THE FOOD IS CHANGED INTO TRUE HUMAN NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matt. xv. 17) : *Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy.* But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (*De Gener. i.*) distinguishes flesh belonging to the *species* from flesh belonging to *matter*; and says that the latter *comes and goes*. Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 3. Further, the *radical humour* seems to belong to the reality of human nature ; and if it be lost, it cannot be

recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humour. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 4. Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

Obj. 5. Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired : for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life ; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.*) : *The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members.* But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Metaph. ii.*), *The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being.* Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways : firstly, in general, according to the species ; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general ; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose forms cannot exist

but in one individual matter : thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself : and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature ; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the *radical humour* ; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter : wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject : else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature.—Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species : as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and suchlike. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species.—Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions ;—or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied ; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of

necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction, as when air is made from water ; or by the change of some other thing, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood ; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction : for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter : for, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxii.) : *All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form.* Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.—Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural : since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity ; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called *natural forces*, would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general : but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of

the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature : because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible.—Firstly, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies ; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual ; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature.—Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. CXVIII.. A. 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer ; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and suchlike parts. This is what the Philosopher says (*Dc Anima ii.*) : *Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh.*

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord does not say that the *whole* of what enters into the mouth, but *all*,—because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be

dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

Reply Obj. 2. By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter : this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food : and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that *just as in things which have their species in matter*—for instance, wood or stone—*so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter.* Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example : that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be of different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always : because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed : thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.

Reply Obj. 3. The *radical humour* is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed ; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the *nutritive humour* is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific

nature, but is on the way thereto ; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply Obj. 4. Every virtue of a possible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this ; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (*De Gener. i.*).

Reply Obj. 5. As the Philosopher says (*De Gener. i.*), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew : but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time : because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEMEN IS PRODUCED FROM SURPLUS FOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (*Dc Fide Orth. i.*) that *generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten.* But that which is generated is pro-

duced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

Obj. 2. Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.

Obj. 3. Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If, therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. x.*) that we were in Adam *not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body.* But this would not be, if the semen were produced from the surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (*De Gener. Animal. i.*) that *the semen is surplus food.*

I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (A. 1; Q. CXVIII., A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject ; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually : hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect : therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution

from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption : and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part.—Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act ; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two : which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole ; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1 ; Q. CVIII., A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power : because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generate seldom ; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.


Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent

that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather ; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Reply Obj. 4. These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam : but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam : and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the *corporeal substance*, not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam ; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For such a birth was becoming to Him,* WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.

* Hymn for Vespers at Christmas ; *Breviary O.P.*



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